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With this thesis I aim to investigate the media influences on Norwegian public opinions on climate  
change  mitigation  policies,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  mitigation  policies  that  target  the 
Norwegian petroleum industry. This is acheived within a theoretical framework that is built to fit  
both  the  media  and  trust  as  important  influences  on  public  opinion.  Drawing  on  theories  of 
motivated reasoning, media representation, and trust in a politically legitimating capacity, I study 
Norwegian survey data from the first wave of the Norwegian citizen panel. 
The results show that people relying on TV for their news update are more prone to be negative 
toward climate change mitigation policies that target the petroleum industry, whereas people who 
read the newspapers and use Twitter are positive toward the proposed policies. In addition, people 
who  are  supportive  of  mitigation  policies  targeting  the  petroleum  industry  do  not  trust  the 
Norwegian  cabinet,  but  they  do  trust  other  people.  The  results  are  the  opposite  when  the 
respondents are unsupportive of the proposed policies. 
These findings suggests first, that there might be substantial differences between the content of the 
TV news as compared to the newspapers. Second, that the petroleum industry rises the stakes, and 
talking about climate change and the petroleum industry at the same time engages people more than 
if  industries  in  general  are  discussed.  Third,  political  trust  may  be  built  on  trust  norms  that  
emphasize  values  such  as  national  economic  development  and  competitiveness,  which  renders 
much support for the Norwegian petroleum industry among the public, and will make it hard to 
establish policies that are not reciprocated by other countries. On the other hand, the level of social 
trust is relatively high, which may indicate that establishing collective action on climate change is 
well within the realm of the possible.  
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1.1 Media effects on climate change and petroleum production
What effects do the media have on the formation of public opinion? More specifically, what do 
these effects mean for policy making on issues such as the Norwegian petroleum production and its 
relation to climate change mitigation? These issues are the main focus of this thesis, and must be 
seen in connection with the salient position public opinion has in any democratic regime: An elected 
goverment or parliament is, by definition, an expression of public opinion (Page et al. 1987: 23). 
For my purpose this means that climate change mitigation policies relies,  although perhaps not 
exclusively, on public opinion. As Austgulen & Stø (2013: 124, my translation) so eloquently put it:  
"The citizens understanding and attitudes toward climate change is  of great  importance for  the 
development of Norwegian climate change policy, and for the legitimacy of that policy."  
On the other hand, the media are relied upon to provide the publics with what they need to know 
about  policies  and  policy  proposals  through  the  account  of  events,  expert  opinions,  political 
statements, political opinions, and interest group advocacy (Page et al. 1987: 24, 34-38). 
The media are capable of setting the public agenda - meaning that they do not necessarily tell us 
what to think, but they are able to influence what we think about and how we prioritize between 
(political) issues (McCombs 2014). 
There has been quite a few studies on public opinion and public worry about climate change, also in 
Norway. One study shows that Norwegians increasingly believe in climate change science, but at 
the same time that they are less worried about it than before (Austgulen & Stø 2013: 127), while  
several studies show that world view and political affiliation are important determinants for what 
people think with regard to climate change (Austgulen & Stø 2013, Kahan et al. 2011, McCright & 
Dunlap 2011, Poortinga et al. 2011).
From the United States, we do know that conservative movement have had success in delaying the 
development of effective climate change policies. This has occured both through the lobbying of 
decision making organs by stakeholder industries and scientists – a science that have been largely 
funded by stakeholder industries, such as the American petroleum industry. In addition, the mass 
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media have been used to make the issue of climate change appear non-problematic to the general  
public (McCright & Dunlap 2003). 
Further, it has been shown that journalistic norms are important for the way climate change has 
been represented  in  the  media.  Again,  studies  from the  United  States  reveal  that  the  norm of 
balanced reporting creates a bias in favour of the climate change sceptics, who are given more space  
to voice their opinions and views against the scientific consensus than what their number justifies 
(Boykoff & Boykoff 2007)
The situation seems somewhat different in Norway. Duarte (2010) shows that the Norwegian press 
is largely reporting on issues in line with the scientific consensus on climate change. She finds, 
however, that the Norwegian press suffers from an authority bias – that journalists have a tendency 
to report only what opinions,  thoughts and views authorities hold,  whether they are political or 
scientific. 
The Climate Crossroads project have investigated several intersections between politics, climate 
science and the media. Naper (2014), for instance, finds that in the lead articles and commentaries 
of the Norwegian press hardly ever make the connection between climate change and Norway's 
contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions through the export of petroleum.  
As noted above, the legitimation of climate change policies comes from public attitudes toward 
climate change as  a  phenomenon.  Another  question is  what  the Norwegian public  think of  the 
Norwegian petroleum industry, how this affects the legitimacy and the implementation of climate 
change mitigation policies, and which role the media plays in this landscape.  
My thesis will contribute to this field of research by seeking answers to the question 
What effects do various news media have on public opinion on climate change mitigation policies  
targeting the Norwegian petroleum industry?
By using a theoretical framework that encompass both motivated reasoning (Lewandowsky et al. 
2013, Kahan et al. 2011) and collectively organised climate change denial (Norgaard 2011, Kunda 
1990),  I  am able to  explain  these  findings  in  a  satisfactory manner  – particularily  when these 
theoretical elements are combined with theory on trust, and how different trust norms may influence  
political choices (Braithwaite 1998).
9
My research question and theoretical framework led to an investigation of survey data from the 
Norwegian citizen panel (Ivarsflaten 2014), and these data revealed that respondents who use TV 
news to stay updated on the news tend to support the petroleum industry, whereas those who read 
newspapers tend to support climate change mitigation efforts, also when they target the petroleum 
industry.  These results  remained consistent,  but  weaker  when tested on a  model  that measured 
support for a general reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This may indicate two things: First, 
that there are differences in the way newspapers and TV-news report on issues related to climate 
change and the petroleum industry, and second, that the respondents are more involved when the 
petroleum industry is concerned, for better or worse.
  
1.2 Why Norway?
Norway is  the chosen case for this  study because the  of its  outspoken engagement  on climate 
change issues in international negotiations on the one hand, and its large petroleum industry on the 
other. 
Norwegians love nature and many people embrace an active lifestyle where they use nature for 
recreational purposes (Norgaard 2011). Environmental values, along with egalitarian ones, have a 
strong hold in the Norwegian public. And environmental issues have been known to spark collective 
action: There were a few incidents of sivil disorder in relation to industrial development and, in 
particular, the building hydroplants in the 1970s and 1980s (Tvedt & Berg-Nordlie 2015, Tvedt 
2014). Environmental activism need not result in sivil disorder, however, and a current case in point 
is the collective action for keeping the petroleum industry out of the vulnerable areas surrounding 
the Lofoten islands, Vesterålen and Senja. Petitions and demonstrations have been used in order to 
stop the government from launching an impact study with regard to petroleum production in these 
areas (Thonhaugen & Steinum 2015).  
On the other hand, Norway is one of the largest petroleum exporters in the world, just after Russia 
and Saudi Arabia (IEA 2011:51), and even though emissions from the burning of fossil fuels are the 
main culprits when it comes to the warming of the globe and climate change, the government are 
opening new blocks to the search for new wells of oil and gas (Regjeringen 2015a). In addition, 
Norwegians seem to be reluctant to engage in global mitigation action through an international 
agreement,  if  countries  such  as  China  (i.e.  large  developing  countries)  are  not  participating 
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(Tvinnereim & Lachapelle 2014). 
Thus, a quite disparate image of the Norwegian public and political scene is painted, and media 
influence  on  Norwegian  public  opinion  on  climate  change  mitigation  policies  targeting  the 
petroleum industry makes a very interesting landscape to study. 
1.3 Political and scientific relevance of the study
Climate change mitigation is of vital importance, since a warming of the globe beyond the goal of 2 
degrees  Celsius  is  associated  with  unknown,  but  most  likely  devastating  consequences  (IPCC 
2014). 
Given the difficulty of legitimating policies without public support (Austgulen & Stø 2013: 124), it 
is important to know which influences shapes public opinion. The mass media is one important 
influence on public opinion (McCombs et al. 2011). The message from the public to the politicians, 
and the other way around, can be muffled or made clearer by the media (Waldahl 1999).
Studies, such as this thesis, which focus on public opinion may give an overview of what the public 
opinion is, and may make it easier for policy makers to develop policies that have a supportive base 
in the public. If policies are perceived as legitimate, the public is also more likely to defer to them 
(Levi et al. 2009: 354).
In addition, we need to know more about the effects of the media upon Norwegian public opinion, 
and media effects in combination with other political and cultural aspects. With this study, I aim to 
make a contribution to this field of research, and make concrete proposals for further research. 
1.4 Outline of the thesis
Chapter 1 has been used to provide a general idea of what this thesis is about. An attempt has been 
made to contextualize the Norwegian case, and provide a basic understanding for the relevance of 
the study. The research question has also been presented.
In chapter 2 I will outline the theoretical foundation for the thesis. Here you will find a literary 
overview, the theory behind the variables included in the quantitative analysis, hypotheses, and the 
theoretical rationale for the analysis of media representations.
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Chapter 3 will consist of an elaboration and justification of the methods used in order to answer the  
research  question,  and  a  presentation  of  the  data  material.  Some  ethical  considerations  and 
methodological weaknesses will also be discussed.
In chapter 4 I will analyse the data presented in chapter 3. First I will go through each model, before 
I tie them together and discuss the implications of these findings.  
Chapter 5 will contain a summary of the entire thesis and a conclusion. In addition, weaknesses 




Trust, public opinion, and the media - a theoretical framework
2.1 Introduction
In the effort to answer the research question “What effects do various news media have on public  
opinion on climate change mitigation policies targeting the Norwegian petroleum industry?” I will 
apply several theoretical approaches, integrated to form a neat whole. In this chapter I will first 
outline the basic concepts this study is setting out to investigate, namely trust, public opinion, and 
media representations. Closely related to the concepts are theories that may explain how public 
opinion on policy issues are  formed, and which role  trust,  the media,  and politics play in this 
shaping. Thus, I will discuss relevant theories, such as trust normes based on values, compliance to 
authority,  motivated reasoning, an journalistic normes in light of these concepts.  Further,  I will 
present  the  variables  and  hypotheses  that  constitute  the  quantitative  analysis  in  light  of  both 




To trust is to harbour certain expectations towards other people. Trusting someone have implications 
for ones own behaviour; both how one may choose to act, but also how one is able to act. Needless 
to  say,  when  you  trust  someone  you  do  not  possess  the  facts  regarding  the  trusted  persons 
knowledge of today nor his behaviour tomorrow (Dasgupta 2000: 51-52, 54). 
Trust as such an expectation is tied to values. Braithwaite (1998) holds that there are two sets of 
values  that  leads  to  different  trust  norms.  It  is  possible  to  tie  these  trust  norms  and  their 
corresponding values to cultural and/or political cleavages (Braithwaite 1998:50-52). This is not to 
say that an individual only holds one type of trust norms, but rather that they come into play in 
different settings (Braithwaite 1998:46). 
Broadly, we can distinguish between exchange trust norms on the one hand, and communal trust 
norms on the  other.  Exchange  trust  norms are  tied  to  security  values.  This  entails  that,  at  the 
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individual  level,  values  such  as  social  recognition,  economic  prosperity,  authority  and 
competitiveness are part of these norms' foundation. At the societal level, values such as economic 
development, rule of law, and national greatness are part of the exchange trust norms base. The goal 
is to protect oneself or ones group from the oppression by others. Communal trust norms, on the  
other hand, are built on individual values such as self-insight, the pursuit of knowledge, self-respect, 
wisdom, tolerance and helpfulness. For society, values such as rule by the people, preservation of 
the natural environment, and greater economic equality creates the foundation on which communal 
trust  norms  are  built.  The  goal  being  peaceful  coexistence  through  a  social  order  that  shares 
resources, promotes cooperation, and communicates mutual respect  (Braithwaite 1998: 49). 
This  distinction  between  communal  trust  norms  and  exchange  trust  norms  is  of  interest  here, 
because individuals differ in the way they proritize between the trust norms, and it may thus be part  
of an explanation for how individuals view their obligations to the collectivity (Braithwaite 1998: 
49). Here there is a vital link to personal world view and political preferences. The values that are 
the  foundations  of  different  trust  norms,  are  also  linked  to,  say  different  political  platforms: 
Someone who is predominantly security oriented will  more likely vote for a conservative party, 
whereas  someone who is  more  harmony oriented will  prefer,  perhaps,  a  social  democratic  one 
(Braithwaite 1998: 67-68). This is important in relation to climate change politics because world 
view, wether one call it security vs. harmony or individualist vs. collectivist, matters when opinions 
about climate change are formed (Austgulen og Stø 2013: 140-144, Kahan et al. 2011: 166-169). 
In  both  the  harmony  perspective  and  the  security  perspective,  the  notion  of  reciprocity  is  an 
important  factor,  along with the way the others are  construed (Kahan 2003: 76-77, Braithwaite 
1998: 52). If attention is focused on utilities - the form does not matter - when a person is deciding 
whether to give or honour trust, it is the exchange trust norms which are in use. If, on the other 
hand, the giving and honouring of trust is a function of how well someone has been socialized to 
harbour values and norms that further collective interests, resistance towards alternative identities, 
and how well they see others who share the same values, it is the communal trust norms which are 
used (Braithwaite 1998: 52-53).  
It should be mentioned that trust is rarily an  ad hoc decision. Usually we have a perception or a 
reason  for  our  trust  decisions:  Trustworthiness.  A person's  or  an  institution's  trustworthiness  is 
usually based on whether the trusted is commited to act in the interest of the truster. The trusted may 
behave in such a manner because of moral values that emphasise the keeping of promises (i.e. 
trustworthiness), whether the trusted cares about the truster, whether there is incentive compatibility 
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between the two, or some sort of comibantion of all three. Alternatively, trust may be given if the 
trusted has competence over a specific domain (Levi & Stoker 2000: 476). 
Whereas trust  is  seen as a facilitator of cooperation,  and in many cases as the opening of new 
opportunities, distrust is largely viewed as loss of opportunities. It could be the loss of economic 
gain or the opportunity to solve a difficult task that requires cooperation (Dasgupta 2000: 49, Hardin 
1992: 154). Distrust  may ultimately destroy a relationship because of un-cooperative behaviour, 
monitoring and watchfulness (Levi & Stoker 2000: 476).
Dasguptas (2000: 51-52) definition of trust as an expectation, will work also in relation to political 
and bureaucratic institutions. Trust is possible because these institutions act in predictable ways, 
which make it possible to expect these acts from them. They act in predictable ways because there 
are institutions, such as the rule of law, that have made provisions to ensure that such is happening - 
at least within a democratic regime (Rothstein 2000: 481). 
Although such a notion of general (the aggregate level of trust in society) and political (trust in 
political  institutions,  and  in  the  political  system)  trust  is  feasible,  it  is  not  unproblematic. 
Establishing such institutions do also constitute collective action problems, and we are facing a 
question to which there exist no firm answer: How is trust created? If institutions create trust, but 
trust is needed to create the institutions, this spiral into a “chicken or egg?” sort of dilemma that I  
will not attempt to answer here. Suffice it to say that trust is important to governments and public 
institutions as it constitutes one source of legitimacy: “The more a government is effective and 
trustworthy, the more legitimacy that government is likely to attain, and the more it will possess the 
potential  to  elicit  compliance without  excessive monitoring or  punitive action.”  (Levi  & Sacks 
2009:  311).  The  term legitimacy  refers  to  the  a  belief  the  citizens  hold  about  the  normative 
appropriateness  of  government  structures,  officials,  and processes  (Levi  et  al.  2009:  354).  In  a 
similar  vein,  Tyler  stresses  the  importance  of  trust  as  a  facilitator  of  democratic  governance, 
because trust leads to deference to authorities (Tyler 1998: 270-276). 
So,  here  trust  is  conceptualised  as  an  expectation.  An expectation  which  may influence  or  be 
influenced by several factors, such as culture, regime type, the media, public opinion etc. In the 
following I shall concentrate on two of these factors; public opinion, and the media. Trust may 
influence public opinion through adherence to different trust norms, which may play an important 
role  in  relation  to  motivated  reasoning.  This  may  be  important  in  relation  to  climate  change 
mitigation policies, where trust norms may feed into the motivated reasoning via the construction of 
“the other” and believes about reciprocity. This, I will return to later. Now I would like to turn your  
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attention toward the concept of public opinion.
2.2.2 Public opinion
Public opinion is perceived as one of the major driving forces of representative democracy (Page et  
al.  1987:  23).  Freedom  of  expression,  equality,  and  the  citizens’ right  to  debate  all  questions 
pertaining to common interests give public opinion a key role in the formation of any democratic 
regime (Waldahl  2007:  9).  There is  no formal  definition of  the concept  of  public  opinion,  but 
McCombs and colleagues have arrived at the following broad definition: “[Public opinion is] the 
collective  consensus  about  political  and  civic  matters  reached  by  groups  within  larger 
communities.” (McCombs et.al. 2011: 2). Further, it is possible to look at public opinion as both a 
process and an outcome,  and it  is  important  to  understand both perspectives to fully grasp the 
concept. In the process perspective the role of dialouge and deliberation are stressed as the key 
elements in the description and evaluation of public opinion. In the outcome perspective, one is 
more interested in the expressions of political participation and action (McCombs et.al. 2011: 2-3). 
Public opinion surveys from the past few years show that Norwegians are consistently concerned 
about climate change (Austgulen og Stø 2013, Austgulen 2012). This concern has yet  failed to 
translate into political action such as changed voting behaviour or demonstrations on single issues 
tied to climate change (Gloppen et.al. 2014). Therefore, I will use the process perspective on public 
opinion when investigating what effects the news media have on public opinion on climate change 
mitigation policies targeting the petroleum industry. I believe firstly, that the process perspective on 
public opinion can shed some light on how the public opinion on this issue is formed. Secondly, it  
may also contribute some answers to the question of non-action when it comes to climate change 
mitigation on behalf of the Norwegian public.
We can consider  the  process  perspective  on public  opinion as  a  combination  of  three separate 
processes:  Cognitive  processes within  the  individual,  collective  processes that  ties  the  citizens 
together through common interests, and political processes that leads to authoritative decisions on 
current issues (Waldahl 2007: 9). These processes require communication in order to work, both 
between authorities and the individual (or vice versa), and between individuals or between groups. 
Hence communication is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the formation of public opinion 
(McCombs et al. 2011: 3). As will be discussed a little later, the media is an important influence on 
these processes as a mediator of messages between authorities and society, and sometimes also 
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between individuals or groups. 
Goertz (2006) asserts that it is useful to organize some thoughts around ones concepts negative 
pole, in this case what public opinion is not. Since public opinion already from the outset is a blurry 
concept, it is rather difficult to imagine what it does not contain. Most obviously it is distinct from a 
private opinion (Lippmann 1991: 45). Not all opinions are relevant as public opinions, for instance 
whether one likes or dislikes the design on the new SUV from BMW (granted, such opinions are 
important to BMW, but I am limiting myself here to public policy making). If one do like the design 
on the new SUV, but still choose to buy an electric car because it is a better choice for the climate, it 
can be regarded as a public statement of one's individual opinion. If, in addition, one is a member of 
an organisation for electric  car owners that advocates the building of  infrastructure for  electric 
vehicles under the notion that it is good climate policy, we are drawing closer to public opinion: 
First, climate change is regarded as a problem, and second, driving an electric car is a better policy 
than driving one fueled by diesel. These opinions may make it all the way in to the political system, 
and when politicians are deciding whether to spend money on infrastructure for electric vehicles or 
not, they are likely to be influenced by the pressure form this particular intrest group, but also from 
other stakeholders that may wish for a different development. 
Thus, using Waldahls three processes, we may say that if the cognitive processes of individuals fail, 
either due to a lack of interest or because of misperception of the facts or the situation, so that an 
opinion does not form at all, there can be no public opinion. Second, if an individual opinion is 
formed, he or she must some way or other make it public, discuss it with other people, and join 
forces with those who hold the same opinion. But other people may not be interested, they may 
have different objectives, or the connecting ties may be weak. Finally, politicians, policy makers 
and  other  stakeholders  in  the  political  process  may  hold  back  information,  obscure  facts  and 
otherwise make it hard to form an opinion on various matters (Waldahl 2007).  
To follow this argument, I will consider public opinion as a process that incorporates numerous 
factors in its making, both at the individual level, but also in relations between individuals and 
groups, and in the relations between citizens and society at large. This view comes from the notion 
that public opinion is not static. It may change if new evidence emerges, if public interests change,  
if  an extraordinary  event  occurs,  or  if  political  decisions  do  not  have  the  intended  effect.  The 
concept of public opinion as a process see past the opinion in itself, and also allow us to investigate 
the various ways an opinion is formed through processes at the individual level, in society and at the 
political level (Waldahl 2007). Here, I will pay most attention to news medias influence on public 
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opinion, but, as we have seen, trust also plays a part in the shaping of public opinion (Leizerowits et  
al. 2012, Terwel et al. 2010).
The process perspective on public opinion is also useful to me in this inquiry because it allows me 
to look into the world of survey data. Survey data map out the attitudes and values of individuals,  
that is true, but aggregated it allows me to search for potential explanations as to which factors 
influence  these  attitudes.  It  is  possible,  for  instance,  to  assess  whether  there  is  a  relationship 
between voting behaviour and the habits of news consumption.  It  is also possible to assess the  
strength of such a relationship should it exist.
The issue of causality is not necessarily clarified through a cross sectional analysis (Skog 2010: 74), 
I have a host of research to lean on in this regard (McCombs et al. 2011, Boykoff 2008, Newton 
1999, Holtz-Bacha 1990), which allow me to make the assumption, for instance, that the media 
influence public worry about climate change. If the various media channels turn out to influence 
what people believe with regard to climate change and mitigation policies differently, it may be one 
of the pieces to the Norwegian puzzle, and part of its solution.   
2.2.3 News media representations 
The third important concept in this thesis is news media representations, which can be defined as 
“...the ways in which the media  portrays particular groups, communities,  experiences, ideas, or 
topics from a particular ideological or value perspective.” (Teaching Film, Television, and Media 
2014, emphasis added). 
In the previous section I discussed what public opinion is, and arrived at a concept that gives weight 
to the process perspective, where communication is a key ingredient. In this thesis I will primarily 
investigate  and  discuss  communication  through  the  news  media,  and  how that  may  affect  the 
formation of public opinion on climate change mitigation policies and the petroleum industry in 
Norway. The news media serves an important accountability function in relation to the government, 
in that information dispersed through the media may, or may not, enhance the trust the general  
public places in the government and public officials (Gordon 2000: 297).  
What we read in the newspaper or see on the TV-news are results of a series of decisions influenced 
by perceived interest and the social impact of a topic, not to mention other “news values”, economic  
considerations  and  editorial  lines  (Carvalho  2007:  223).  Also,  which  model  of  journalism  is 
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prevalent  in  that  particular  media  business  is  important:  Firstly,  journalists  and editors  may be 
looking to give the readers what they believe the readers want (the market model). Secondly, the 
journalists and editors may be looking to support a given cause, a political party, a politician, etc. 
(the advocacy model). Finally, the editors and the journalists may be wishing to present an issue in 
neutral, objective way, guided by professional codes of ethics, and principles of disinterested public 
service (the trustee model) (McCombs et al. 2011: 43-46). 
A democracy  is  dependent  upon  an  enlightened  and  informed  public,  and  this  cannot  happen 
without  communication  (McCombs  et  al.  2011:  3).  Thus,  the  news  media  must  function  as  a 
mediator for information. These messages are not just mediated, however, they have undergone a 
transformation on the way from the sender through the media system to the reciever. Reporters, 
editors,  television  news  broadcasts,  newspapers,  and  other  news  outlets  usually  partake  in  the 
production, reproduction and transformation of values and worldviews  in various media discourses, 
whereas other values and worldviews may largely be excluded (Carvalho 2007). This may quite 
easily be illustrated by the differences in the media discourses regarding climate change in western 
democracies versus the discourse in India. In the UK, for instance,  the media discourse is  still 
questioning climate science, and gives a fair amount of publicity to so called contrarians, whereas 
those news media that acknowledge global warming and climate change, are still a running large 
circles around policy proposals, policy debate and serious mitigation initiatives (Carvalho 2007). In 
India, on the other hand, the largest English newspapers have acknowledged climate science. The 
prevalent  media  discourse  in  these  papers  frames  the  North-South  relationship,  and  largely 
advocates a view where Western countries must cut their emissions first, in order to “clear up” the 
mess they have caused (Billett 2010). 
Media as mediator is a view that stems from Walter Lippmann, who in 1922 wrote about how media  
plays an important role in describing the events of the world to people far away from where the 
event takes place (Lippmann 1991). However, as Lippmann also pointed out, people may read about 
these events  (today we may watch them as well),  and perceive them differently,  depending on 
various socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Lippmann 1991). One of the key problems 
addressed by Lippmann was that people do not see facts for what they are, but rather what they 
perceive them to be. We tend to define first, then see – not the other way around (Lippmann 1991: 
81). Althouhg human perception is extremely important, we must not forget the opposite argument 
– namely that the news media may pick and choose in various ways of framing and priming, and 
that various aspects of a story will be emphasized, whereas others may  be undercommunicated or 
even ignored (McCombs et al. 2011, Carvalho 2007). 
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Another influence on media representations are the norms that journalists usually write according 
to,  which can be devided into first  and second order journalistic norms. First  order journalistic 
norms comprise  of  personalisation,  which  means  that  a  story  is  framed in  terms  of  individual 
tragedies  and  not  on  the  bigger  issue;  dramatisation,  which  drives  journalists  prefer  crises  of 
continuity,  and  leaves  little  space  for  the  day  to  day  workings  of  political  institutions,  policy 
making, etc; and, at last novelty. The norm of novelty forces journalists to constatly chase the news, 
which leaves ongoing, unresolved issues outside the news frame (Boykoff & Boykoff 2007: 1192). 
Second order journalistic norms are authority-order and balance. The authority-order norm requires 
journalists to get statements or quotes from authorities, whether they are government authorities, or 
experts in a field. The norm of balance requires journalists to give approximately the same amount 
of attention to parties in a conflict, or when opinions are devided on an issue (Boykoff & Boykoff 
2007: 1192-1193). Together, these five norms informs the the choice of issues that are considerd 
“news” on any given day, and they also instruct journalists and editors in their framing of the issue 
that passes the gate.   
Hence, media representations are important in the shaping of public opinion. First, they play an 
important role in setting the public agenda. Without media coverage it is unlikely that an important 
problem will either enter the arena of public and political discourse (Dispensa & Brulle 2003: 79). 
Second, the media may be a force that spark collective action,  for example in the issue of the  
Norwegian government opening the Lofoten islands, Vesterålen and Senja to petroleum production, 
were some media, Twitter in particular, are specifically geared towards collective action (Segerberg 
& Bennett  2011).  Third,  the  media  may be  a  force  that  spark  disagreement  and  fierce  debate  
because they sometimes feed into predjudice and cleaveges already manifest in society – again the 
issue of opening the Lofoten islands, Vesterålen and Senja to petroleum production serves as an 
adequate example (Aftenposten 2015a). And at last, media representations may influence political 
action, specifically on single issues that arises. One such example is the recent case where many 
asylum seekers with children that had lived in Norway for a long time were sent out of the country. 
Media attention has, on this issue, led to a revision of some of the cases (Rundsveen & Randby 
2015).
2.2.4 A brief summary of the concepts
These three consepts; trust, public opinion and media representations, are all important in the day to 
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day workings of a democracy. The political leadership is elected based on public opinion, in which 
the media have helped to shape. But the political leadership needs also to be trusted in order to be  
able  to  govern,  and  the  media  contributes  to  such  a  relationship  of  trust  by  its  accountability 
function. One could say, that public opinion in essence is trust, and that whom the public chooses to 
trust or distrust is based, at least to some extent, on the account of events represented by the media. 
It is the interplay between these concepts that I aim to map out by looking into the effects various 
news  media  have  on  public  opinion  about  climate  change  mitigation  policies,  targeting  the 
Norwegian petroleum industry.   
2.3 Climate change mitigation, public opinion, and the media
Norway is an interesting case to study on account of two reasons in particular. On the one hand 
Norway has a desire to be progressive on environmental issues, and aspire to be a leading nation in 
international negotiations on climate change action (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 2012). 
On the other hand Norway is one of the largest petroleum producers in the world. The Norwegian 
economy and welfare-system, especially in the future, is quite dependent upon the revenues from 
this industry. In this section I will lay out some theories that may help individuals reconcile these 
two roles that the government alternates in playing, albeit with particular emphasis on the effects the 
media may have in this regard. 
Mass media play a key role in serving people with facts. The media cannot  tell  people how to 
perceive these facts, but they do choose which facts people get to see (McCombs 2014). The facts 
are chosen by the journalists according to journalistic norms and pressures that the journalists and 
editors are  under  from vested interests  in  the topic written about  or the mediahouse owners  or 
leaders (Boykoff  & Boykoff 2007, Carvalho 2007). 
If the principle of balanced reporting is to be followed on the issue of climate change, people will be 
confused with  regard  to  what  is  actually  widely accepted knowledge.  This  may turn  out  to  be 
dangerous,  because it  leads to political  inaction and policy gridlock (Boykoff & Boykoff 2007, 
McCright & Dunlap 2003). However, the issue of climate change raises fundamental questions on 
the legitimacy of our industrial society, our way of life, and shows that fossil economic growth is 
unsustainable - at least if it continues as today (Clark & York 2005). So, climate change proves to be 
a bit of a marketing challenge: People might not want to know – because the consequences of that  
knowledge are frightening or may imply changes to our way of life that we dislike – even if the 
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media are writing seriously about it.
The  media  shape  complex  science,  policy,  and  political  debate  into  narratives.  Furthermore, 
journalists refuse, for the most part, to tell stories in the abstract (Smith 2005). This have major 
implications for the coverage of climate change, because as an abstract and untangible phenomenon 
it is likely to be side lined in “competition” with other news. Unless it can be related to an event 
such as extreme weather or natural disasters, and then the connection made by journalists may be 
scientifically wrong. In addition, it is a question of scale. Climate change is usually defined as a  
global  problem, but  it’s  consequences are  local.  Hence,  as a  matter of scale,  climate change is 
difficult to fit with the layout of the news (Smith 2005).
2.3.1. Motivated reasoning
Walter Lippmann held that public opinion is formed by facts. Nevertheless, he questioned his own 
assumption by asking, for instance, who were there when the event happened to account for the 
facts? How are the facts distributed? How are these facts perceived? How much time do people 
spend on learning the facts of an event? The analyst of public opinion should “…begin then, by 
recognizing the triangular relationship between the scene of action, the human picture of that scene, 
and the human response to that picture working itself out upon the scene of action” (Lippmann 
1991: 16-17). In other words, Lippmann points to the cognitive process of the individual: We live in 
the same world, but we perceive it differently. Our perception of the world is largely made up of 
preconceived images in our minds, and when we read about the world in the media, we interpret the 
texts in accordance with these images. 
Today we may draw a parallel to the theory of motivated reasoning: The human propensity to select 
and construct beliefs about the self, other people, and the world in general according to directional 
goals  or  motives (Kunda  1990).  Motivated  reasoning  is  related  to  the  notion  of  cognitive 
dissonance, which essentially means that there is a discrepancy between what an individual believes 
and what he does, which results in a change of believes (Festinger & Carlsmith 1959: 203-204). It is  
important to note, however that two inconsistent beliefs are not sufficient to produce dissonance 
motivation  and  a  following  change  in  beliefs  or  behaviour.  Kunda  (1990:  488)  shows  that 
dissonance  is  stirred only  when people  choose  to  get  involved in  activities  that  has  forseeable 
negative consequences – if it threatens and involves the self. 
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2.3.2 Organized climate change denial
Climate change may constitute one example of an issue where cognitive dissonance may arise and 
lead to motivated reasoning, because its existance challenges and threatens the Western way of life 
– which is largely built upon an “industrial capitalism powered by fossil fuels.” (Clark & York 
2005, cited in  Dunlap and McCright  2011: 145).  If  we take the causal  order  for granted,  such 
cognitive  dissonance  has  made  the  production  of  organized  climate  change  denial,  where 
stakeholders in both trade and politics uses the media and scientific uncertainty to reproduce climate  
change  as  a  contested  issue,  relatively  easy.  McCright  and  Dunlap  shows,  for  instance,  how 
important the American conservative movement, which is an important part of the environmental 
countermovement,  was  in  the  process  leading  up  to  the  US  rejecting  the  Kyoto  protocol. 
Conservative think tanks, largely funded by the fossil fuel industry and conservative foundations, 
utilized political hearings, the media, scientific expertise, and a change in the political opportunity 
structure – the republican takeover of the US Congress in 1994 – alongside corporate and union 
activities and lobbying to thwart any legislative action to ameliorate global warming and climate 
change (McCright & Dunlap 2003, Dunlap & McCright 2011). This development has been further 
contextualised by Antonio and Brulle (2011), who states that concervative and neoliberal politics 
have sought to undermine environmental issues already in the 1970s, as it represented a threat to the 
free market and neoliberal ideology in that the government would have incentives to start regulating 
business. In other words, to some of the conservative American, climate change and regulation of 
energy consumption represents  a “left-wing anticapitalist  conspiracy.”  (Antonio & Brulle 2011: 
198). 
On the Norwegian scene, there are not many studies, to my knowledge, that have focused on the 
organized production of climate change denial as driven by (public) stakeholders in such an obvious 
way as in  the US,  where the petroleum industry is  a major actor and contributor  to contrarian 
science,  for instance (Oreskes and Conway 2010,  Dunlap & McCright  2003).  On the surface, 
however, the Norwegian petroleum industry is trying to send the message to the Norwegian public 
(and others) that it is looking to the future, that Norwegian petroleum production is sustainable and 
needed – also in a long term perspective – and that it operates within a climate friendly paradigm 
(Statoil 2015a, Statoil 2015b, Hornmoen 2014, Norsk olje og gass 2010). 
Rather, the kind of organized climate change denial that has been studied in the Norwegian context 
is social, which means that ignoring is a response to social circumstances, and carried out through a 
process of social interaction (Norgaard 2006: 374). In her ethnographic study, Norgaard shows how 
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the inhabitants in a relatively small community in Norway avoid thinking about climate change and 
global warming, and how they engage several cognitive and emotional protective meassures when 
the issue surfaced in a conversation. Using Cohen's notion of implicatory denial, she shows that in 
relation  to  climate  change  it  is  “the  psychological,  political,  or  moral  implications  that 
conventionally follow” that is minimized or denied (Cohen 2001: 8, Norgaard 2006: 374). 
Norwegian people possess a quite large amount of knowledge about climate change, and public 
opinion surveys indicate that a large majority are quite worried about it (Eide et al. 2014: 10), but 
Norwegians  fail  to  incorporate  this  knowledge  into  their  everyday  lives  by  changing  personal 
behaviour  and/or  engage  in  social  action  (Eide  et  al.  2014:  10,  Norgaard  2006:  374).  As  the 
knowledge  on  climate  change  and  related  issues  clashes  with  the  Norwegian  self-image  as 
environmentally aware, egalitarian and humanitarian it  may lead to cognitive dissonance (Norgaard 
2006: 382, Kunda 1990), and Norgaard shows how Norwegians have developed several strategies 
of emotional management to solve this dissonance, such as selective attention (concerning news and 
other sources of information), perspectival selectivity (often pointing to Norways small size, or the 
US as a climate laggard) (Norgaard 2006: 385-389). 
This is not to say that ordinary Norwegian citizens bear the sole responsibility for the absence of 
effective  climate  change  policies  in  Norway.  Kjersti  Fløttum  and  Tonje  J.  Espeland  (2014) 
conducted a linguistic analysis of two Norwegian white papers (Norwegian Climate Policy and The 
High North. Means and Visions, both from 2011-2012). Their conclusion was that the government 
did indeed convey different messages. In the white paper on Norwegian climate policy, emphasis 
was put on the negative effects of climate change, and what Norway could do to mitigate them. 
However, all these measures must be economically feasible, and the conclusion is that the white 
paper contains mixed messages that may lead to uncertainty on which political goals are actually 
pursued (Fløttum & Espeland 2014: 11). In the white paper on the high North, climate change is 
presented as a threat to a vulnerable region, but the better part of the paper is devoted to how 
climate change represent an opportunity for added value and economic prosperity in the region, 
with particular emphasis on petroleum exploration and production (Fløttum & Espeland 2014: 15). 
The findings of Fløttum & Espeland indicates that the Norwegian government is betting on two 
horses, and this duality may affect public opinion in the sense that the citizens do not perceive the 
seriousness of climate change nor the urgency with which one must  act  (Eide  et  al.  2014:  17, 
Lorenzoni et al. 2007).  
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2.3.3 Impact of political and cultural values
Motivated reasoning in an individual is related to that individuals values and beliefs, particularly if 
it is tied to the self (Kunda 1990). International research shows that motivated reasoning in relation 
to climate change and climate change science is closely tied to cultural and political values. In the 
US climate  change denial  was  closely  tied  to  conservative  values,  the  republican  party  and a 
neoliberal ideology (Antonio & Brulle 2011, Dunlap & McCright 2011). 
In the US, climate change has become a social identity marker alongside issues such as abortion and  
gun control (Nisbet 2011: 360).  McCright & Dunlap (2011) find that significant ideological and 
partisan polarization has occurred on climate change within the American public over the years 
between 2001 and 2010. Left-leaning people are more prone to hold a view on climate change 
which is in line with the scientific consensus – that climate change is happening and that the human 
contribution  to  climate  change  is  substantial  (McCright  &  Dunlap  2011:  155,  166).  Scientific 
findings  also  suggest  that  political  orientation  moderate  the  effect  of  educational  attainment 
(McCright & Dunlap 2011: 161-162, 174). 
In  a  similar  vein,  Leizerowitz  et  al.  (2012)  show that  political  orientation  and cultural  values 
influenced peoples perception of “climategate”, the scandal that occurred when e-mails between 
British and American climate scientists leaked to the press and was used to discredit the entire field 
of research. It was people who where, through their political affiliations, predisposed to skepticism 
(they voted Republican,  or  held  conservative  values)  that  suffered  the  greatest  loss  of  trust  in 
climate science and scientists (Leizerowits et al. 2012: 827).  
Kahan  et al. (2011) have used the theoretical framework of cultrual cognition of risk to test the 
hypothesis  that  people  interpret  scientific  knowledge  on  global  warming  and  climate  change 
according to their cultural values. Their findings suggest that people in the US with more egalitarian 
and communitarian values tend to believe that most scientists agree that the planet is warming, that 
it is caused by humans, and that this poses a threat to society, whereas people with hierarchical and 
individualistic values are more likely to believe that scientific experts do not agree on these issues, 
and tend not to percieve global warming and climate change as significant risks (Kahan et al. 2011: 
157-166).  
Scholars have made similar findings within the UK, where people who vote conservatively and 
possess  low environmental  values  tend to  be  more  uncertain  about  the  reality  and  severity  of 
climate change (Poortinga et al. 2011: 1017, 1019). In addition, older people from a lower socio-
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economic background were more likely to express climate scepticism, as were people who did not 
intend to vote. Also, men were more likely than women to express a sceptical view on climate 
change. Climate scepticism where more common among people who are politically conservative 
and  hold  traditional  values,  whereas  it  was  less  common among  those  people  who hold  self-
transcendent and environmental values (Poortinga et al. 2011: 1022). 
Although political orientation and cultural values matters for attitudes to climate change elsewhere, 
the picture may be different in Norway. In the Norwegian parliament, Stortinget, there is now a 
broad consensus regarding climate change: All  the largest parties, that is The Labour party,  the 
Socialist Left, the Centre, the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Christian Peoples party, except the  
Progress Party, signed an agreement in 2008 which saw a few amendments in 2012. This agreement 
states  the goals  of  Norwegian  climate  policy,  such as  the  fulfilling of  the  commitments in  the 
Kyoto-protocol and add 10% to that, global emission cuts equalling 30% of Norways emissions 
back in 1990, that Norway will be carbon neutral by 2050 (or 2030, if a global agreement enters  
into force) (Stortinget 2012). 
The  parliamentary  agreement  and  the  2013  election  campaign,  where  climate  change  did  not 
become a major issue, have led scholars to argue that when it comes to Norwegian politics, climate 
change is a valence-issue, meaning that everyone agrees that something must be done and that there 
are no clear cut frontiers (Gloppen  et al. 2014: 29-30). There is some support for this notion in 
survey material  from Norway: the relationship between partisan affiliation and attitudes toward 
climate change is weaker than in for instance the US and the UK (Austgulen & Stø 2013: 141-142). 
There is, however, also evidence to the contrary. The parliamentary climate agreement from 2012 
secures broad agreement on the goals of the climate policy, but does not give a lot of guidance as to 
which means one should use in order to reach them. Indeed, there is no unanimity among the parties 
at Stortinget as to how the threat posed by global warming and climate change should be alleviated. 
By establishing political consenus through the 'climate agreement', one has depoliticised the issues 
of global warming and climate change. The result is a muted politcal debate, a false consensus, and 
possibly also a hindered a public debate on innovative solutions (Gloppen et al. 2014: 30, 40). 
It should be noted that on the 25th of March 2015 Stortinget (including the Progress party) agreed to 
adopt  a  new propsal  for  climate  change mitigation  goals  from the  conservative  cabinet,  which 
entails negotiations with the EU, and possibly a affiliation to EU-goals. The overarching goal is a 
40% reduction of emissions compared to the 1990-level by 2030. The means to reach this goal is 
still blury, and the cabinet did not allocate any portion of emission cuts to specific industries, or 
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even to Norway as a whole (Regjeringen 2015b, Dagbladet 2015)   
2.3.4 The media 
News media are said to be “powerful vehicles for communication of climate science” (Boykoff 
2008:  3).  Studies  from  the  UK  and  US  shows  that  the  press  and  the  TV-channels  have  an 
ideological tint,  and that this also emerges in the news coverage of climate change and climate 
change science. News media which tend to sympathise with conservative values, individualism and 
a  liberalisation  of  the  market,  also  tend to  give  climate  change sceptics  and  contrarians  more 
coloumn  space  and  more  often  question  scientific  findings  and  the  emerged  consensus  (e.g. 
Carvalho 2007, McCright  and Dunlap 2003).  This means that how various news media frames 
climate change as an issue is important. 
In addition, there are grounds for taking a critical look at how journalists are reporting an issue: 
Journalistic norms, such as objectivity, balance, fairness and accuracy are important elements in 
shaping  what  becomes news, not to mention  how  the news are told (Boykoff 2008: 3). Scholars 
have focused much attention on the journalistic norm of balance in their research, where balance 
refers to the norm that opposing sides in a story should have approximately the same amount air-
time or column space. In one sense this norm functions as a validity check, because journalists do 
not have the time nor the expertise to check the validity of all claims (Boykoff 2008: 3, Dunwoody 
& Peters 1992: 210), but it also functions as a tool with which the journalist is capable of carrying 
out  his  reporting  in  a  neutral  and  objective  manner  (Boykoff  2008:  3,  Entman1989:  30).  The 
findings in this family of research strongly indicates that the journalistic norm of balance creates a 
bias in the reporting on climate change, both in the press and on TV (Boykoff 2011: 108-109, 
Boykoff 2008: 8).    
Maxwell McCombs (2014) maintains that the media do not tell you what to think, but they do a 
good job telling you what to think about. Media have a strong public agenda setting role, and a 
number of studies show that this hold true also in relation to climate change. Yuki Sampei and 
Midori Aoyagi-Usui (2008) shows that concern for global warming in Japan is closely related to the 
amount of media coverage the issue gets. Their study also indicates that global warming is covered 
as an international issue, not domestic. This is particularly evident in their finding regarding an 
environmental campaign, launched by the Japaneese government, which was designed to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases and energy consumption. Global warming was rarely mentioned in 
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the articles on this campaign in the three largest Japaneese newspapers. A further implication of this 
is that the general public will not make the connection between global warming and emission cuts.
Simon Billett (2010) made an interesting finding in his study on the coverage of climate change in 
the Indian mass media. Indian environmental journalists are covering climate change in line with 
the scientific consensus. However, there is a distanciation between cause and effect – namely that it 
is the industrial North that have caused global warming and climate change, whereas India and the 
rest of the South must endure the consequences. This reflects the position of the Indian government 
on the matter: India and other developing countries must be allowed to emit greenhouse gases in 
order to reach the same level of prosperity as the Western countries, while the Western developed 
countries  must  take on  their  historical  responsebility  and cut  their  emissions.  However,  Indian 
media is not alone in such distanciation: Carvalho (2007: 235) shows that even if the Guardian has 
printed articles that shares the scientific consensus point of view, and also ethical considerations 
towards developing countries and future generations, the question of who is responsible and what 
concrete  actions  should  be  taken  politically  and  personally  has  not  been  touched  upon  to  a 
significant extent. 
In Norway, the image of climate change in the media is somewhat different. Duarte (2010) found 
that the journalistic norm of balance was less salient in her sample of newspaper articles. She shows 
that  a  majority  of  the  articles  in  her  sample  support  the  scientific  consensus  and  writes  that 
anthropogenic climate change is happening, whereas only 8% of the pieces were sceptical (Duarte 
2010:  46).  She  points,  however,  to  an  “authority  bias”,  meaning  that  it  is  largely  politicians, 
scientists and experts, besides the journalists, that are voicing an opinion in her sample. Lay people, 
particularily women, are not coming forward in the media (Duarte 2010: 52-58). 
Naper (2014) conducted a content  analysis of commentaries in various Norwegian newspapers. 
Findings from her sample, suggests that journalists rarily make the connection between Norwegian 
petroleum  production  and  climate  change.  Rather,  the  petroleum  indstry  goes  free  from 
inconvenient criticism, because the public discourse that surrounds the petroleum industry and its 
relation to climate change, is either a humanitarian one, where Norwegian petroleum will provide 
energy to poor people in other parts of the world, or it is one of “building the nation”, meaning that  
the industry provides the Norwegians with employment, development, and welfare.
 
Another study finds that there is a significant polarization between newspapers with regard to the 
petroleum industry and climate change. Through an analysis of the presentation of the government 
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white  paper  on  the  petroleum industry  in  2011 by then-cabinet  minister  Ola  Borten  Moe  and 
subsecuent news articles, lead articles and commentaries on the announcement of this white paper, 
Hornmoen  (2014)  shows  that  there  exits  several  discourses  on  climate  change  and  petroleum 
production in Norwegian newspapers. Several voices were clearly critical  towards the ministers 
account  of  Norwegian  petroleum policy  as  good climate  policy  and the  necessity  of  a  further 
expansion of  the  industry  to  the  north,  and these  were  largely written in  national  newspapers.  
Articles in local newspapers, particularly in the Stavanger area (which is the “petroleum capital” of 
Norway), in the North of Norway, and in papers where the issue was presented in the economy 
section, the language and arguments of the minister was largely adopted. 
The picture I have aimed to paint here, is one that shows that the ordinary citizens of Norway are 
not the only ones that seem paralysed in the face of global warming and climate change. When both 
politicians and the media are serving unpalatable truths about global warming and climate change 
politics one day, and sing praise to the petroleum industry the next, it  is bound to affect public  
opinion on these issues, and possibly also in connection to mitigation efforts. I will return to this 
briefly in connection with the variables and hypotheses used in the study, but first we must take a 
look at the other important explanatory factor in this thesis: trust.  
2.4 Climate change, public opinion and trust 
In this section I aim to show that interpersonal trust and trust in the government influence public 
opinion on climate change, and that it  matters for climate change mitigation policies. This is a 
relatively new avenue of research in relation to climate change and the society, but it is an important 
avenue,  since climate  change is  conceptualised in  much of  the  literature as  a  collective  action 
problem (Tvinnereim 2013, Ostrom 2010, Hardin 1968). This take on climate change as an issue, 
means that trust is needed in order to solve the collective action problem, in both a social and  
political capacity: Social trust for reasons of reciprocity in particular (Kahan 2003), and political  
trust because it increases the legitimacy and credibility of a given policy (Levi et al. 2009). 
For the most part, the litterature on climate change has focused on relatively concrete segments of 
trust,  such as trust  in (climate change) scientists  (Lewandowsky  et  al.  2013,  Leizerowits  et  al. 
2012), or trust in the (news) media (Boykoff & Boykoff 2007). In the following, I will focus on how 
trust may be tied to motivated reasoning, how the notion of reciprocity affects trust, and how media 
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influence both political and social trust.
Above, trust was conceptualised as an expectation. This provieds a rather broad view of trust, as it 
can be used simultaniously about a close friend and a public official or a complete stranger. Such a 
conception is also able to encompass the underlying value base on which our trust is built.
2.4.1 Trust, motivated reasoning and collective action
 As mentioned above, Braithwaites (1998) notion of differing value bases to build different trust 
norms upon, fits with the notion of motivated reasoning. Shared values and beliefs are important in 
the  formation  of  social  trust.  Socialisation  from  childhood  helps  people  know  what  to  do  in 
situations where they might have to juggle their own needs with the expectations from others. This 
is facilitated, among other things, by internalisation of shared conseptions of how things should be 
done. This type of knowledge becomes part of an individuals belief system and are used to interpret 
future events and guide decisonmaking (Braithwaite 1998: 47). 
Belief systems are comprised of attitudes, values, needs and interests that are interconnected and 
also show a great deal of cognitive consistency. A value may be defined as a lasting belief that a 
“certain mode of conduct or goal in life is personally or socially preferable to the converse mode of 
conduct or goal in life across specific objects or situations.” (Braithwaite 1998: 48). 
These belief systems and their encompassed values can, as we saw earlier, be tied to different sets 
of trust norms. These norms are not apolitical, but rather shaped also by political ideas and values, 
so that people who tend to vote for leftist parties would also have a propensity to rely on communal 
trust norms, where collective values are important. People who would vote for right wing parties, on 
the other hand, would prefer to rely on security trust norms, that draws a distinct line between “us” 
and “them”, and a promote values of economic development etc (Braithwaite 1998: 67-68). This is 
not to say, for instance, that it is only people who vote for conservative parties that rely on exchange  
trust norms (Braithwaite 1998: 46). 
Kahan (2003) underlines the significance of trust in the creation of collective action. He shows how 
trust is necessary when building reciprocal relationships of cooperation (Kahan 2003: 76-77). And 
reciprocity seems to be an important facilitator of trust. People are, for instance, more likely to pay 
their taxes if they believe that "everyone" else is paying theirs (Kahan 2003: 81). In addition, if one 
succeeds in establishing a system where reciprocity is positive, say where one would feel shame or 
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guilt for buying a car that is fueled by petrol or diesel and not by electricity, one would, potentially,  
be able to avoid costly incentives on behalf of, in this case, the government (Kahan 2003: 76-77). 
Kahan's notion of reciprocity can quite easily be related to exchange trust norms and security values 
– as it is, after all, an exchange. Thus, in order to establish trust according to exchange trust norms, 
reciprocity must be secured. 
In  the extention of  this  argument,  I  point  to  Tvinnereim & Lachapelle  (2014),  who show how 
Norwegians are  more sceptical  of Norway's  commitment  to  any international  agreement  on the 
curbing of greenhouse gas emissions, if countries such as China do not sign the agreement. This 
shows that reciprocity may be a key ingredient in a collective action effort,  which is important 
considering  that  global  warming and climate  change are  defined as  collective  action  problems 
(Tvinnereim 2013: 380, Ostrom 2010: 550). The Norwegian attitudes are, in this case, most likely 
tied to the vulnerable Norwegian economy, and its petroleum producing capacities (Tvinnereim & 
Lachapelle 2014: 13), which lends some support to the notion of reciprocity in relation to trust. A 
possible  deduction from this  is  that  reciprocity  and trust  are  also  important  for  within-country 
collective action, such as recycling, reduced consumption, or the willingness to limit the number of 
air travels.
It should, however, also be noted that IPCC is the source of information about climate change that 
Norwegians  mostly  trust.  Other  trusted  sources  of  information  about  climate  change  are  the 
authorities  and  the  NRK  (the  Norwegian  broadcasting  corporation).  At  the  other  end  of  the 
spectrum are  environmental  NGO's,  climate  change  sceptics  and  the  newspaper  Verdens  Gang 
(VG), who's information the Norwegians tend not to trust. Norwegian's trust in climate science is 
significantly lower than their trust in other sciences (Austgulen 2012). 
Austgulen & Stø (2013) finds that Norwegian scepticism of the issue of climate change revolves 
around the seriousness and accuracy of climate science, and also how problematic the consequnces 
of climate change may prove to be. These attitudes toward climate change varies with world view 
and political  ideology,  as  previously discussed.  The authors  of  this  article  stress  that  emphasis 
should be laid upon how climate change is communicated to various groups and individuals in 
society, and that the authorities, but also the political parties, have a particular responsibility for 
how they  communicate  climate  science  to  the  public  and  their  voters.  They  also  suggest  that 
involving the  public  to  a  greater  extent  in  the  efforts  to  mitigate  climate change may increase 
peoples understanding for and participation in such efforts – thus increase the legitimacy for the 
various policies (Austgulen og Stø 2013: 144-145). 
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Based on what I have laid out so far, it can be argued that such efforts to engage the public to a  
greater extent is also an effort to increase trust, both in a political sense, but also to help establish 
reciprocity among people in general: “I feel bad if I don't carpool to work, because it is good for the 
mitigation  effort,  and  all  my  collegues  do”.  This  brings  me  onto  the  subject  of  how  trust  is 
important for the legitimacy of a policy, and the legitimacy of the authorities to implement such 
policies in general, but also toward the petroleum indutry in particular. In addition, communication 
on climate science and climate policies reaches the public through the media (Eide  et al. 2014), 
which means that it is necessary to look into what effects the media have on social and political 
trust.
2.4.2 Trust, the media and the authorities
Earlier we saw that a trustworthy state or institution has more legitimacy within the citizenry than 
one that is not trustworthy (Levi et al. 2009: 354). This implies that the citizens trust (or at least that  
they do not openly distrust these institutions (Hardin 1998)) is indeed important to the functioning 
of state institutions. We have also visited the notion of legitimacy in realtion to policy making. 
It is hard for the government to legitimate a policy that holds little support among the public. This is 
particularily true for the issue of climate change. Nisbet (2009) finds that the American government, 
with the then newly elected president Obama in the lead, wished to implement more climate change 
mitigation policies, but that this was difficult without the engagement from lay people. He further 
shows  that  the  lack  of  engagement  and  the  politication  of  the  climate  change  issue  (where 
republicans do not take climate change seriously, whereas democrats do) is partly down to how 
trusted sources of information frame the climate change issue (Nisbet 2009: 18-20).
As we saw just above, the authorities and NRK are trusted sources of climate change information,  
in addition to the IPCC (Austgulen 2012). When we also know that many Norwegian newspapers 
cover the issue in accordance with scientific consensus (Duarte 2010), it is easy to imagine that 
climate change mitigation would have high priority among both lay people and the authorities in 
Norway. Still, it does not. Most Norwegians get their information regarding climate change from 
the media (Eide et al. 2014), and the media are important gatekeepers that play a descriptive, but 
also a normative, role in the debate about climate change (Høiby & Ytterstad 2014: 66). Therefore,  
it is reasonable to believe that the media will influence peoples trust in the governement, and hence 
the legitimacy with which they are able to govern on certain issues. 
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A fair bit of the research in this field has revolved around the thesis of “video malaise”, a term 
originally  coined  by  Michael  J.  Robinson,  where  the  decline  of  trust  in  public  and  political 
institutions and the increase in political cynicism where connected to the rise of television as a  
mediator of political news (Holtz-Bacha 1990: 73). Contrary to this thesis, however, are findings 
from Germany. Holtz-Bacha (1990: 79) finds no connection between deteriorating political trust 
and the content of political media, but entertainment content, on the other hand, have a detrimental  
effect on political trust. 
Newton (1999) finds  similar  results  in  the  UK. Paying attention to  the news serves  to  engage 
Britons more politically,  regardless of whether they read the newspaper or watch the television 
news. Reading a broadsheet newspaper is significantly more tied to mobilization on political issues 
than reading a tabloid newspaper. Reading a tabloid was not significantly different from not reading 
a  newspaper  at  all,  although it  was  not  specifically  tied to  political  malaise  either.  Broadsheet 
readers were also less cynical and more trusting than the rest of the respndents (Newton 1999: 589, 
592).  Further,  watching  a  lot  of  general  televison  is  slightly  associated  with  less  political 
mobilization, but there is no evidence of political  malaise although there are slight evidence of 
cynicism and low subjective efficacy (Newton 1999: 592). Newton (1999: 598) concludes that it is 
the content that matters in its mobilizing effects, not the media form. 
The discussion of video or media malaise does not end there, however. Mutz & Reeves (2005) find 
that following political debates on TV may significantly lower Americans political trust, because of 
the behaviour of the participants in the debate. People respond negatively to incivilities in political 
debates broadcasted on TV. It is, however, difficult to say whether behaviour such as this have a  
negative effect on trust also through other types of media due to the significant differences between, 
for instance, TV and newspapers (Mutz & Reeves 2005: 13).
In her 2007 article, Mutz shows television broadcasted political debates enhance peoples knowledge  
about politics and also their knowledge of the arguments used by people who maintain the opposing 
view to ones own. However, if these debates are characterised by incivil behaviour and close-up 
camera angles, the viewers would take a less understanding and accepting view of the oppositional 
arguments, and they would like and respect the proponents of these views less. These findings are 
of  importance  here  because  less  respect  for  the  opposition  may  result  in  lowered  trust  if  the 
opposition happen to be the ruling party. If such is the case the legitimacy of any given policy may 
become an issue (Mutz 2007: 633). Also, Mutz' findings support the notion of motivated reasoning 
in that people seem to selectively perceive the content of what they are viewing: “The perceived 
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legitimacy of one's own side of a controversy is unharmed by incivility even when it is of the “in-
your-face” variety (Mutz 2007: 633). 
These studies seem to strengthen the link between the legitimacy of authorities and their policies 
and trust.  Simultaniously it also shows that the media may influence this trust at  least  to some 
extent. With these points clarified, it is now time to turn to the variables and the hypotheses that will  
guide my research toward answers to the overall research question – namely what effects the media 
have on climate change mitigation policies targeting the Norwegian petroleum industry.    
2.5 Variables and hypotheses
In order to answer the research question about what effects  various newsmedia have on public 
opinion about climate change mitigation policies targeting the petroleum industry, I have chosen to 
conduct a quantitative analysis. To be accurate, I will  conduct four analyses where I assess the 
impact  of  the  same  independent  variables  upon  four  different dependent  variables.  These 
assessments will be compared, and this comparison will hold the conclusion to this thesis. 
In this section I will first present the dependent variables: First, support for taxation of exploratory 
activities in the petroleum industry. Second, support for the petroleum production rate. Third, worry 
about climate change, and finally, support for general reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases. 
The reason for using four different dependent variables is to provide a richer, or thicker and more 
nuanced answer to the research question, in line with what a case study usually, but not always, 
entails (Yin 2014: 19). 
Second, I will present the independent variables and the hypothesised effect they will have on each 
dependent variable in turn. These variables are related to the themes of political  affiliation, the 
media and trust.  At last  I will  include the control variables,  which are the usual suspects:  Age, 
income, education and gender. 
2.5.1 Dependent Variables 
Opinions about taxation on exploration and test drilling
In order to see how opinions about taxation of the exploration and test drilling are affected by the 
media, I have chosen a dependent variable that measures people's support for such a policy. The 
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dependent variable is derived from two questions measuring the respondents support for further 
taxation of the petroleum industry with regards to the search for and development of new petroleum 
reservoars. The text preceding the question is: “We will now ask your opinion on a few measures 
that  have  been suggested  in  order  to  mitigate  climate  change.  Many experts  believe  that these 
measures will work. Yet, there is some conflict as to whether these are good measures to implement.  
How positive or negative would you say you are to the measures mentioned here?” (Ivarsflaten et  
al. 2014: 56, my translation). The following questions were: Reduce the tax benefits for petroleum 
exploration  on the  Norwegian continental  shelf,  and  Intensify  the  tax  regulation  for  petroleum 
exploration on the Norwegian continental shelf (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 56, my translation). 
This  variable  is  chosen as  the  dependent  variable  because  it  functions  as  a  measure on public 
support for a climate change mitigation policy, and it specifically targets the petroleum industry. 
The survey documentation also details that these questions where asked in the context of climate 
change mitigation (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 56). 
As a concrete policy proposal, it is possible that it is easier for people to take a stand, rather than 
using a more abstact measure. To most Norwegians the petroleum sector is important, not only 
financially but  also cultrally.  Most  people avoid discussing the Norwegian petroleum industry's 
contribution to global warming and climate change, and to many people there are significant values 
attached to the industry – in terms of living standards, welfare, etc. (Norgaard 2011). 
It should be noted, however, that this variable is not straight forward to use. The taxation rules for 
the  petroleum  industry  are  intricate,  and  encompass  exploration  and  extraction  activities  of 
resources  under  the  seabed.  Leading  the  Norwegian  state  to  earn  about  78%  tax  revenue  on 
petroleum activities (KPMG 2015). However, costs in relation to exploration is more or less paid 
for  by the government  through transcriptions.  The argument for such an arrangement  is  that it  
would generate more activity and more employment (KPMG 2015).  
To put more taxes on the petroleum industry in the phase of exploration and test drilling may give  
higher income to the Norwegian state treasury, especially at times where the prices on petroleum 
products are high and such activities will still pay off in the long run. If the petroleum prices are 
low, on the other hand, it is less likely that oil companies will initiate further exploration, because 
the revenues will not be high enough. Thus, in the last scenario the taxes will be good for the global 
climate, but will probably hurt the economy in two ways: First, government income will drop due to  
less activity on the Norwegian continental shelf, and second, possible stagnation in the Norwegian 
economy as a whole due to the recession in this sector alone. 
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Opinions about petroleum production rate
The previous dependent variable is more or less targeting my research question. However, the tax 
rules that the petroleum industry is subject to is, as we have seen above, relatively complex. For this 
reason, I have decided to conduct 3 more analysis. This will add weight to the first analysis, and 
also help verify the findigs. Therefore, a measure on whether people believe that the Norwegian 
petroleum production rate should increase, stay at todays level or decrease has been chosen. The 
original question was posed as follows:  Which of the following statements do you mostly agree  
with?  With the following possible  answers: 1.  Norway should continue producing petroleum at  
todays level. 2. Norway should produce less petroleum than today, and 3. Norway should produce  
more petroleum than today (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 50).
Worry about climate change
In order to better understand how the news media influence public opinion on mitigation efforts 
related to the petroleum industry, it is useful to assess its impact on how worried people are about  
climate change. If the media variables have a similar impact on worriedness and support for climate 
change mitigation efforts it would strengthen my analysis. Using this variable as a dependent can be 
viewed as a confirmatory exercise, with a media twist, to form a firm base to build the analysis of  
main  interest.  Also  beginning  in  this  end,  may  shed  some  light  on  how  important  motivated 
reasoning is in the relationship between climate change beliefs and beliefs about the Norwegian 
petroleum industry.  The  respondents  were  asked  How worried  are  you about  climate  change?  
(Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 50, my translation).
Opinions on a general regulation of emissions
At last,  I  will  conduct an analysis  with a dependent  variable that measures support for general  
regulation of CO2 emissons among the industry in Norway and Europe. As we have seen, there is  
empirical evidence that shows that the petroleum industry holds a significant position in Norway 
(Norgaard 2011, Gloppen et al. 2014). In order to assess the impact of media upon public opinion in 
relation to the petroleum industry, I also need to assess whether the media have similar effects upon 
other  mitigation  policies.  This  dependent  variable  is  also  constructed  by merging to  questions. 
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These  two questions  shared the  same introduction as  the  questions  making up the  measure on 
opinions about taxation on petroleum exploration, but the statements after where:  Instensify the  
regulation on how much CO2 the industries in Norway and Europe may emit by cutting the total  
number of quotas these industries are aloud to use, and Intensify the regulation on how much CO2 
the industries in Norway and Europe may emit in total (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 54-55). 
2.5.2 Independent variables
Media  
Media constitutes the main source of information about climate change for Norwegians (Eide et al. 
2014:  Ryghaug  et al.  2011:  784).  In  addition,  the  media  is  also  the  most  important  source  of 
information about climate change issues (Eide  et al. 2014: 11). The media is thus quite likely to 
have an impact upon public opinion on climate change mitigation policies targeting the petroleum 
industry. In order to measure this impact, I have included three variables that measure how often the 
respondents use TV-news, newspapers (in paper format, not online), and twitter, respectively. This 
will  provide an inkling as to whether there are any differences in the effect by different media 
sources. TV and newspapers reaches the largest audiences (Eide et al 2011). Twitter is included in  
the analysis on the grounds that social media is becoming more and more important in peoples 
everyday lives, and because social media are part of a “personalised politics” trend where collective 
action has been replaced, in many respects, by personalised action through social media (Bennett 
2012). Also, twitter has been frequently used in relation to climate change politics and civic action 
(Segerberg & Bennett 2011). The variables are derived from the question How often do you use the  
following media in order to stay updated on the news? (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 116, my translation). 
And thus, I have included measures for TV-news use, newspaper reading and Twitter. In light of the 
theoretical perspectives and empirical findings discussed earlier, I have arrived at  the following 
hypotheses:
H1: The use of TV news to stay updated on the news will have a positive effect on all the dependent 
variables.
H2: Reading the newspaper will have a positive impact upon all the dependent variables.
H3: Twitter-use has a positive impact on worry about climate change and support for the proposed 
mitigation policies. It has a negative impact on opinions regarding the petroleum production rate. 
37
Trust 
Trust is important to the formation of public opinion, but public opinion also depend on trust. It has 
been shown that trust in climate change scientists and in the media is important for what people 
believe about climate change (Leizerowitz et al. 2012), and that trust is important for the legitimacy 
of implemented climate change policies and for the legitimacy of the authorities in general. Since I  
am looking at climate change as a collective action problem, which is dependent upon both trust  
and reciprocity in order to be solved, I have chosen to include three measures of trust: The first is 
derived from the question How high trust or distrust do you place in the following institutions and  
actors? (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 39, my translation), and measures trust in the Norwegian cabinet. 
The measure of social trust is based on the question Would you say that, in general, most people  
can be trusted, or that one cannot be to careful in one's dealings with others? (Ivarsflaten et al. 
2014: 48, my translation). The last  measure of trust,  is one that targets the Norwegian political  
system as a whole, as it measures beliefs about one's own opportunities to influence politics. The 
measure is built on this question:  Look at the statements below. To what extent do you agree or  
disagree with them?, followed by People like me may cast a vote, but there is nothing else we can  
do in  order  to  influence politics (Ivarsflaten  et  al.  2014:  47-48).  I  believe  these  variables  will 
influence the dependent variables in the following way:
H4: High levels of interpersonal trust will have a positive impact on all the dependent variables.
H5: Trust in the government will have a positive impact on all the dependent variables.
H6: Believing that one cannot influence the political scene in other ways than by voting, will have a 
negative impact on all the dependent variables.
Political values 
Based on previous research, there is pretty strong evidence pointing to motivated reasoning as an 
explanation to the contrast between the scientific consesus on anthropogenic  climate change, and 
the lack of action both at the national but also at the individual level. Motivated reasoning is partly 
culturally embedded, and partly political. It is tied to which personal values and goals an individual 
possess (Kahan  et  al.  2011, Norgaard 2011, Norgaard 2006). In this thesis,  I  will  focus on the 
political,  by using  Which party did you vote for in the parliamentary election?, followed by 10 
alternatives as a variable (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 25, my translation). 
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H7:  The  variable  will  impact  the  climate  change  variables  positively,  and  the  production  rate 
variable negatively.
 
2.5.3 Control variables 
The control variables included in this study are socio-demographic variables that are known to have 
a significant impact upon the formation of opinion, particularily in relation to climate change.  In 
addition, it is assumed that their inclusion will contribute to the overall fit of the model. 
  
Age
Earlier research have showed that younger people tend to be more worried about climate change, 
than older  people  (Poortinga  et  al. 2011:  1017,  1019, Hamilton  2011:  237).  Thus,  I  make  the 
following assumption:
H8:  Age  have  a  negative  impact  worry  about  climate  change,  and  support  of  the  proposed 
mitigation policies. Age will have a positive impact on opinions about the petroleum production 
rate. 
Gender
According to previous research, women tend to be more worried about climate change than men 
(Poortinga  et  al.  2011:  1017,  Hamilton  2011:  236).  Therefore  gender  is  included  as  a  control 
variable, and gives the following hypothesis:   
H9: Gender will impact worry about climate change, and the mitigation policies negatively, but will 
a positive effect on opinion about the petroleum production rate.
  
Education 
Previous research has shown that education is important, but that it does not necessarily change 
your mind if you are predisposed to a certain opinion (Hamilton 2011, Poortinga et al. 2011: 1017, 
1019). My hypothesis in this regard is:
H10:  Education  have  a  positive  impact  on  worry  about  climate  change  and  support  for  both 




Income has proved to have an effect on opinions on climate change in previous studies (McCright  
& Dunlap 2011: 168-169). It  is possible that how much one earns also shapes ones values and 
adherence to political  ideology - higher income may lead to adherence to more conservative or 
individualistic values, and thus my hypothesis is: 
H11: Income has a negative effect on worry about climate change, and support for the mitigation 
proposals. It will affect opinions on the petroleum production rate positively.
Table 2-1: Summary table of the hypotheses
Dependent variable H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H11
Worry + + + + + - + - - + -
Production rate + + - + + - - + + - +
Tax + + + + + - + - - + -
Emission + + + + + - + - - + -
2.6  Summary
In this chapter I have first mapped out the concepts that are important for the understanding of this 
study. Trust is conceptualised as an expectation, that may influence public opinion or be influenced 
by public opinion. Trust is important for the legitimacy of a policy, but also for the entire regime. 
Further, in my concept of public opinion, it is seen as a process, and this process is influenced by a 
large number of factors, such as age, gender and education. But also cultural and political influences  
are very important for how issues are perceived and ultimately what individuals think of them. The 
media are important mediators of messages, opininons and events. But they are also gatekeepers 
that construct the politcal and public agenda. How an issue is (re)presented in the media may have 
strong bearing on what we think of that issue. 
My theoretical framework shows how various news media may matter in the shaping of public 
opinion on climate change issues by linking it to the notions of motivated reasoning and collectively  
organised denial. I am drawing on previous work that specifically look into how climate change 
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issues and the Norwegian petroleum industry is made out in the media. My theoretical framwork 
also incorporates a more general account of trust, by showing how political and social trust matters 
for  the  legitimacy  of  any  climate  policy  the  authorities  seek  to  implement.  In  addition,  my 
framework points to ways the media may affect trust (particularily political trust) by drawing on 
previous research into the media malaise theory. 
At the end I  have also presented the variables I  am going to  use in the analysis,  and also the 
hypotheses that will guide the analysis toward answering my research question regarding the effects 






A quantitative approach to the assessment of media impact on public 
opinion
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the methods I will use in my search for answers to the research question. 
Analysing the impact news media have on public opinion with regard to climate change mitigation 
policies targeting the petroleum industry can be done in several ways, but a case study of Norway 
based on quantitative data has been chosen. 
In this chapter I aim to, first, explain why I chose a quantitative analysis based on survey data as the 
method of choice along with a discussion of some relevant pitfalls that may hamper a quantitative 
study. Second, I will present and discuss the Norwegian Citizen Panel data, before I lay out the 
operationalization of the variables.
 
3.2 Data
Being interested in what effects the media have on public opinion, public opinion being a collective 
opinion shared between individuals and groups of individuals (McCombs et al. 2011: 2-3), it makes 
sense to study individuals in order to establish the effects various news media have on the forming 
of public opinion
Such data was of relatively easy access to me, through an ongoing online survey project between 
University  of  Bergen,  the  UNI  Rokkansenteret  and  several  institutes  at  the  Faculty  of  Social 
Sciences at the University of Bergen called the Norwegian citizen panel (Høgestøl & Skjervheim 
2013: 2). The idea is to establish a panel of citizens, representative of the population, in order to 
conduct surveys and survey experiments for social scientific purposes.  
   
3.2.1 Data collection
The data used in this analysis is from the first wave of the Norwegian Citizen Panel (Ivarsflaten 
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2014). The unit of analysis is, as insinuated above, the individual – Norwegian citizens above the 
age of 18. The survey is conducted in Norway, with counties as the geographical unit (Ivarsflaten et  
al. 2014a: 4) 
The reqruitment process started with the drawing of a large intitial sample, in the end consisting of 
24 942 potential panel members over the age of 18, which together where representative of the 
population.  The  sampling  was  conducted  by  Evry  from  the  Norwegian  National  Population 
Registry, on behalf of the Norwegian Tax Administration after the necessary permissions where 
obtained (Høgestøl & Skjervheim 2013: 2-3).
Panel members were recruited per post. First by a letter containing a detailed description of the 
project and how to participate, later a reminder was sent as a postcard to those who had not logged 
on, completed the survey, or had not provided their e-mail address. From the gross sample, 4905 
surveys were completed (Høgestøl & Skjervheim 2013: 4). 
In  the  final  sample  there  are  som discrepancies  regarding  the  representativeness.  Here  I  only 
comment on what is relevant to my thesis. The main challenges were first of all access and ability to  
use the internet – which is connected to age.  Second, the motivation and interest of the respondents 
is always an issue (Høgestøl & Skjervheim 2013: 5). 
3.2.2 Representativeness
Overall,  younger  (18-29  years  of  age)  and  older  (60  years  of  age  and  older)  are  slightly 
underrepresented, while the middle age group is over represented. The under representation of the 
older age group can be explained by the way the survey was conducted. Increasing age makes it 
slightly less likely that one is accustommed to the use of internet.
Women are slightly over represented overall, but not in every subgroup.
There is a systematic over representation of people with higher education within every subgroup. 
This  is  probably  due  to  this  groups  overall  interest  in  politics  and  public  issues  (Høgestøl  & 
Skjervheim 2013: 6).
Due  to  these  biases,  both  Høgestøl  &  Skjervheim (2013:  8)  and  Ivarsflaten  et  al.  (2014a:  4) 
recommends the use of weights. I have decided to heed this advice to some extent. All of the four 
major models in chapter 4 has been tried with weights, but the differences between weighted and 
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unweighted models are so small, that I have chosen only to report the unweighted models in this 
thesis. The weighted models can be seen in the appendix to chapter 4.
3.3 Operationalization and descriptive stats of the variables
In the previous chapter I explained the need for four different dependent variables - the dependent 
variable I wish to focus on is not ideally suited for an analysis on its own, due to a very complex 
political background. I wish to use the same independent variables and controls in all four analysis, 
but I will not, however add the variables used as dependent variables in any of the other analysis. 
The reason for this choice is that I fear they will “steal” the lime light, and thus obscure the effects 
that I am wanting to study. In this section I will discuss my choice of type of regressions.   
3.3.1 The dependent variables
Worry about climate change
The variable describing how worried Norwegians are about climate change. It is derived from the 
question How worried are you about climate change?, (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 50, my translation), 
to which the respondents could  choose between 5 categories. These were coded 1-5, where 1 is  
"very worried", 2 is "worried", 3 is "a little worried", 4 is "very little worried ", and 5 is "not at all  
worried". There was also a sixth category called "not answered". In my dataset I recoded this into 
missing values so that they where omitted from the analysis. I have recoded and dichotomised the 
variable in order to be able to conduct a binary logistic regression. The categories 1, 2 and 3 are 
merged and then recoded to 1, and the categories originally coded 4 and 5 are are merged, and then 
recoded to 0. 
There are pros and cons in the use of a dichotomised dependent variable, particularily connected to 
the dichotomisation itself. In this case, the variable is not a natural dichotomy, such as gender. It has 
5  distinct  categories,  that  are  easily  ranged,  which opens  up  for  an  ordinal  logistic  regression 
(Fullerton  2009).  Using such an  approach  would  have  enriched the  analysis  by  telling  us,  for 
instance, in which categories of the dependent variable the various media have more or less impact.  
However, since the purpose of this analysis is to see what effects the news media have on the level 
of worry in general, and if these effects are similar to the effects in the other analyses, I decided that 
the loss of information by dichotomising the variable  was not  too great  compared to the more 
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difficult interpretations of the results rendered from the multinominal logistic regression when the 
information rendered from the binary logistic regression is what I need in order to compare the 
results across different models.
Dummy variables are also a neat in that they describe qualitative phenomena (Midtbø 2012: 43), 
and are often used in the social sciences (see for instance Levi et al. 2009). Also, since the analysis 
of these dependent  variables are  of an exploratory nature,  I  argue that,  at  the moment,  general 
knowledge about what effects the media, political and social trust have on opinions about climate 
change is needed, and that detailed knowledge should be the next step.  
As can be observed in figure 3-1 below 82% of the respondents say they are worried about climate  
change. This constitutes a large majority. In table 3-1, it may be observed that the variable has a 
negative lopsidedness, and a lightly enlarged kurtosis. This is no surprise, given the large majority 
that  are  worried  about  climate  change  (Midtbø  2012:  60).  This  deviation  from  the  normal 
distribution can also be seen graphically in the appendix to chapter 3. Although it is an advantage 
that the variable does not deviate from the normal distribution in a statistical analysis, it is not a 
premise, and since the kurtosis has not yet reached the critical level of 10 i choose to ignore the 
issue (Midtbø 2012:  60,  71).  Also,  there was  not  really  a  good alternative  transformation  (see 
appendix to chapter 3). Therefore I have chosen not to transform this variable. 
Figure 3-1: 
A)Norwegian worry about climate change                 B) Opinions on production rate
Opinions about the Norwegian petroleum production rate
This variable is discribing what Norwegians think about the petroleum production rate. It is derived 
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from asking  people  which  statement  they  mostly  agree  with.  The  first  being  "Norway  should 
continue to extract  the same amount of oil  as we do today", coded 1. The second statement is 
"Norway should extract less oil than we do today", coded 2. The third statement is "Norway should  
extract more oil than we do today", coded 3. In addition, there is a fourth category which is coded 
97, which is the "not answered" category (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 50, my translation). 
In order to be able to conduct a binary logistic regression, I have recoded the variable to a dummy 
variable, where the category originally coded 2 is recoded to 0, and the categories originally coded 
1 and 3 are are merged, and then recoded to 1. The "not answered" category is recoded to missing  
values and will be omitted from the analysis. 
As the  pros  and cons of  the  use of  a  dichotomised dependent  variable  and the  binary logistic 
regression is discussed under the operationalisation of the previous dependent variable, I need not 
repeat it here. Instead, I procede to the descriptive stats. 
As can be observed in figure 3-1 above, most of the respondents (56%) still want the petroleum 
production rate to stay at the same level as today or increase. This variable also shows a negative 
lopsidedness (see table 3-1, the two rightmost coloumns). Here too, there is a deviation from the 
normal distribution, but it is still possible to procede without such normality (Midtbø 2012: 71). 
Also, there is not really a good alternative transformation (see table 3-2 in the appendix to chapter 
3). Therefore, I have chosen not to transform this variable.
Table 3-1: Descriptive stats for the dependent variables
Variable name Mean Median Std. dev. Number of obs. Skewness Kurtosis
Worry about climate change 0.82 1 0.38 4734 -1.68 +3.81
Petroleum production rate 0.86 1 0.50 4665 -0.24 +1.06
Support for tax +4.24 4 +1.47 2249 -0.13 +2.67
Support of regulation +5.38 6 +1.26 2296 -1.08 +4.39
Support for taxation of the petroleum industry's exploration ventures
The variable measuring attitudes towards or support for heavier taxes on the exploration side of the 
petroleum industry is comprised of two variables, which originally were part of a survey experiment  
(Høgestøl & Skjervheim 2013: 9). As I explained in the previous chapter,  this measure is  quite 
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complex, which is why I argue the need for four separate analysis. The other three models will serve 
as verification. These two variables are derived from two questions posed to two different segments 
of the population. These questions had the same meaning, but they were posed slightly differently, 
in order to see whether people responded differently to them (see previous chapter for the wording 
of the questions). I merged the two variables, which also leaves me with a larger N for the analysis, 
which is preferable for one reasons in particular: It lowers the chances of certain statistical errors 
(Midtbø: 114).
The new variable is coded 1 for "very negative", 2 for "negative", 3 for "somewhat negative", 4 for  
"neither nor", 5 for "somewhat positive", 6 for "positive", and 7 for "very positive". All other values 
are coded to missing, in order to remove them from the analysis. As can be observed in table 3-1 
above, the average answer (4.24) is slightly toward the positive attitude, and the categories 5-7 
combined reveal that 40% of the respondents have a positive attitude toward the suggested tax, 
whereas 26% harbour a negative attitude (see figure 3-2 below). There is a rather large middle 
category (34%) that do not take a stand on this issue. This could be because of the complex nature 
of the question. As was outlined in chapter two, such a tax may lead to reduced activity on the 
Norwegian continental shelf, which could possibly reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases, 
but may also prove to have consequences that are affecting employment rates etc (see chapter 2). So 
it might be that people are not able to take a stand on the issue up front. 
This variable also deviates slightly from the normal distribution, which may be observed in the two 
rightmost coloumns of table 3-1. The distrubution is slightly left-leaning, which may be observed in 
graphic in the appendix to this chapter. Seeing as it is an advantage that a variable does not deviate 
from the gaussian distribution in a statistical analysis, but not a premise (Midtbø 2012: 71), I have 
decided to do nothing about it given that the deviation is quite small (Midtbø 2012: 60). 
Figure 3-2
A) Support for new petroleum tax                            B) Support for reduction of GHG emissions
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Support for a general regulation of CO2 emissions
This variable measures attitudes towards or support for a more general reduction of greenhouse 
gases. This variable was originally two different variables originally used in a survey experiment to 
test attitudes toward emission trading systems (ETS) among Norwegians (Høgestøl & Skjervheim 
2013: 9). The questions posed to two separate segments of the population had the same meaning, 
but  were posed in two slightly different ways,  as showed in chapter  2.  There turned out to  be 
significant differences between the two groups, and I argue that it is important to be aware of this. 
Still,  I  do  not  think it  will  have  any direct  bearing  upon the  analysis  I  am going to  conduct.  
Therefore, I merge these two variables. An additional advantage is a larger N for the analysis, which 
is preferable for reasons stated in the previous section. 
The merged variable measuring support for a general reduction of CO2 emissons is coded 1 for 
"very negative", 2 for "negative", 3 for "somewhat negative", 4 for "neither nor", 5 for "somewhat 
positive", 6 for "positive", and 7 for "very positive". All other values are coded missing, in order to 
remove  them  from  the  analysis.  The  average  answer  is  5.38,  which  is  somewhere  between 
"somewhat positive" and "positive", as can be observed in table 3-1 above.   A clear majority of the 
respondents harbour a positive attitude toward this policy proposal. 81% of the respondents fall into 
the categories 5-7, whereas only 7% maintain a negative attitude. 12% are indifferent or unable to 
take a stand. The middle category here could have been defined better (which also goes for the 
measure for support for the petroleum tax). "Neither nor" is a category that invariably opens up for  
interpretation. It is not impossible to say whether the respondents are indifferent to the proposal, 
whether they do not know what to answer because they do not understand, or if they are stalling – 
that is understanding, but waiting for a "better" solution. 
This variable deviates more from the normal distribution, than the other dependent variables. This 
can be observed in the two rightmost coloumns of table 3-1 above. The distrubution is clearly left-
leaning,  which  may  be  observed  in  graphic  in  the  appendix  to  this  chapter.  Using  the  Stata 
command "ladder" shows that a square transformataion of the varibale could absolve the problem to 
a (very) limited extent (see table A3-4 in the appendix). Since this transformation still renders the 
deviation  from the  Gaussian  distribution  statistically  significant,  I  have  decided  to  leave  it  be 
(Midtbø 2012: 71). 
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3.3.2 The independent variables
Watching TV news
This variable is derived from the question “How often do you use TV in order to stay updated on 
the news?”. The variable is coded 1 for "never", 2 for "more rarily", 3 for “several times a week”, 4 
for “every day”, and 5 for “several times a day”. The category of “non-response” is recoded to 
missing values, and thus omitted from the analysis. This order of the category is the reverse of the 
original, but I find it is easier to interpret the findings in the analysis when more is actually more. 
A rather large majority of the respondents watches tv every day or several times a day. Combined, 
these two categories make up 74% of the respondents, of which 47% say they watch the news every 
day (see figure 3-3). This is also confirmed by the mean: the average amount of TV-news watching 
was 3.88, so almost every day (see table 3-2). 
Again, the variable deviates slightly from the Gaussian distribution, and again, I have decided not to 
transform it. First of all, the deviation is quite small (see table 3-2). Second, there are not really any 
good alternatives (see table A3-5 in the appendix). Since this is not a premise for the analysis, I 
choose to leave is as it is (Midtbø 2012: 60).
Figure 3-3
A) TV-news use                                                      B) Newspaper reading
Reading newspapers
Derived from the question “How often do you read newspapers to stay updated on the news?”, this 
measure is coded 1 for "never", 2 for "more rarily", 3 for “several times a week”, 4 for “every day”,  
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and 5 for “several times a day”. The category of “non-response” is recoded to missing values so as 
to omitt it from the analysis. The variable was originally coded in the reverse order. 
As can be observed in figure 3-3 B, a little over half of the respondents read newspapers every day 
or more. 28% of the respondents says they rarily or never read newspapers. The average newspaper 
reader reads the paper somewhere between several times a week and every day (3.31, see table 3-2). 
This measure too, deviates slightly from the Gaussian distribution. However, the deviation is small 
(see table 3-2), and there really are not any good alternatives (see table A3-6 in the appendix). Since 
adherence to the Gaussian distribution is not a premise for the analysis, I choose to ignore the issue 
(Midtbø 2012: 60).
Using Twitter
This variable was derived from the question "How often do you use Twitter to stay updated on the 
news?", and it is, same as TV-news use and newspaper reading, coded 1 for "never", 2 for "more 
rarily",  3 for “several times a week”,  4 for  “every day”,  and 5 for “several times a day”.  The 
category of “non-response” is here also recoded to missing values so as to omit it from the analysis. 
The variable was originally coded in the reverse order. 
Figure 3-4: The use of Twitter
A large majority, 80%, of the respondents never uses Twitter as a source of news, and only 5% 
report that they use Twitter in this capacity every day or several times a day, see figure 3-4, above. 
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This creates a heavy lopsidedness on the variable, which can be seen in table 3-2 below, where the 
level of kurtosis sky rockets. Here, it has reached the critical level of 10, and it is recommended that 
one does something about the problem. (Midtbø 2012: 60). However, there does not seem to be a 
transformation that ameliorates the problem (see appendix, table A3-7), so I prefer to keep it as it is. 
One should, however, keep this slant in mind while interpreting the results of the analysis. 
Table 3-2: Descriptive stats for the explanatory variables
Variable name Mean Median Std. dev. Number of obs. Skewness Kurtosis
TV 3.880209 4 .9718018 4583 -.8804403 3.43967
Newpaper 3.313909 4 1.083252 4479 -.360011 2.134535
Twitter 1.36321 1 .8657356 4050 2.778985 10.44102
Trust in Government 4.767184 5 1.327795 4510 -.8192711 3.095221
Interpersonal trust 6.631174 7 2.237635 4677 -.761089 3.364308
Political influence 3.578298 3 1.799375 4700 .3288639 1.884873
Political view 1.91401 1 1.000047 4140 .2697397 1.250164
Interpersonal trust
To measure interpersonal trust, an 11-point scale was used. Respondents were asked to tick off on 
this scale from 0-10 how much they believed other people can be trusted, where 0 represented “One 
cannot be to careful in relation to other people”, i.e. no trust, and 10 represent “most people can be 
trusted”. In this case, I have kept the original variable, save the category of “non-response” which I 
recoded to missing values so as to omit it from the analysis. 
As can be seen in figure 3-5 A) below, a majority of the respondents are high trusters. The middle 
category is category 5, and 73% of the respondents have given their level of trust a higher score  
than that. 18% fall into the two highest categories, and only 17% fall into the categories 0-4, which 
indicates low trust. Thus, Norway is a high trust society, which is a confirmation of other research 
(Rothstein & Uslaner 2005: 42). 
In table 3-2 we may observe that the measure suffers from a lopsidedness. This is also observable in 
figure 3-5. I have chosen to leave it as it is, because there are not any transformations that can 
alleviate the issue in a satisfactory manner, and also that adherence to the Gaussian distribution is 
not a premise for the later analysis. (Midtbø 2012: 71). 
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Figure 3-5: 
A)Interpersonal trust                                              B) Trust in the government
Trust in the government
To measure trust  in the government,  people were asked to define their  trust  in the government 
according to an eight point scale ranging from 1, being “very high trust”, to 7, being “very high 
distrust”. The eighth category is “do not know”. I have reversed this scale, due to considerations of 
interpretation, and also recoded the category “do not know” to missing. This operation lowers the 
number of observations, but the effects of different levels of trust in the government will become 
clearer. 
In figure 3-5 B) above, we may obeserve that 67% of the respondents places some level of trust in 
the government. This implies that Norwegians tend to trust the government regardless of who the 
current  incumbents  are,  although  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  one  places  more  trust  in  the 
government that one has voted for, as one may, conscious or not, place more legitimacy in this 
government (Mutz: 2007). 19% of the respondents claim to place some degree of distrust in the 
government. 
This measure also suffers from some degree of lopsidedness, but, as can be seen in table 3-2 above,  
it is not a serious slant. Since the analysis does not require me to do anything about it, I will leave it  
as it is (Midtbø 2012: 71). In addition there are no transformations of the variable that alleviates the  
problem (see table 3-8 in the appendix).  
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Political influence 
Beliefs about political influence was measured on a eleven point scale, asking people to take a stand 
to the statement “The only way to influence politics is through voting in elections”. The original 
measure was coded from 1, “strongly agree” through to 7, “strongly disagree” (Ivarsflaten et al. 
2014: 47-48). Again, I have recoded the variable to make interpretation of the analysis easier. The 
result may be found in figure 3-6 A) below. I also dropped the category “not answered” from the 
analysis, so that the effects of beliefs about political influence could become more clear. 
57% of the respondents say they disagree with the statement, whereas 36% say they agree with the 
statement. 8% are in the middle category “neither nor”. As I have discussed earlier, this category is 
not ideal, because it does not give any ideas as to what the respondents are actually thinking about 
it. 
This measure too suffers from a slight slant towards the left, which makes sense according to the 
distribution  of  answers.  I  have  not  tried  to  correct  this  slant,  as  it  small,  and  that  a  normal  
distribution of values on a variable is not a premise for the analysis to come (Midtbø 2012: 71).
Figure 3-6:
A) Voting is the only way to influence politics       B) Parties voted for in 2013 election
Political view
To measure the respondents political view, they were asked which party they voted for in the 2013 
election.  The  categories  was  each  of  the  parties  represented  in  Stortinget  (the  Norwegian 
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parliament), and one additional category for smaller parties. I have recoded this variable so as to 
reflect the current collaboration in Stortinget, and the political discourse on climate change in the 
election campaign prior to the election in September 2013 (Gloppen et al. 2014: 28-29). This means 
that the votes for the Conservative party (Høyre), the Progress party (Fremskrittspartiet), the Liberal 
party (Venstre) and the Christian democrats (Kristelig  folkeparti)  were all  coded 1 and dubbed 
“Liberal”. Only one party was coded 2, and that was the Green party (Miljøpartiet de grønne), 
which  was  labeled  “Independent”.  The  parties  coded  3  for  “Socialists”  was  the  Centre  party 
(Senterpartiet), Labour (Arbeiderpartiet), the Socialist Left (Sosialistisk Venstre parti), and the Red 
party (Rødt). The category of “Other” was kept, and coded 4. A few respondents did not receive this 
question, and these where omitted from the analysis by a recoding to “missing values”.
Let it be clear, however, that this coding is used on the basis of cooperation in parliament, and, to 
some degree, the respective parties climate change or environmental engagement. I do doubt, quite 
strongly, that the Centre party, for instance, would accept being called “socialist”, even though they 
do share some of the environmental values of the socialist parties. Whereas the Liberals, who do 
actually argue a quite progressive environmental policy, would probably loath being put in the same 
category as the Progress party – who is known for their very progressive petroleum policy (Venstre 
2015, Fremskrittspartiet 2015).
In figure 3-6 B) above, we may observe that 53% of the respondents voted for the Liberals, 4% 
voted for the Independents, and 41% for the Socialist parties. 2% voted for “other” parties. 
The variable has a small slant to the left, but again it makes no sense to transform the measure as 
the transformations will not make any improvement to the variable (see appendix).
3.3.3 Controls
Age
The measure for age contains 3 categories: “18-29 years”, “30-59 years” and “60 and older”. Here 
the original variable is used, because it was recommended in connection with the use of weights and  
the de slight over representation of groups on some of the variables (Høgestøl & Skjervheim 2013: 
7-9). 
In figure 3-7 A) below, we can observe that 57% of the respondents are between 30 and 59 years of 
age. 18% are in the younger category and 25% are 60 years of age or older. The variable is skewed 
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slightly to the left, but I have chosen to do nothing about it, as the deviance is quite small (see table 
3-3).  
Figure 3-7:
A) Age                                                                  B) Gender
 
Gender
Gender is a natural dummy variable. It was originally coded 1 for “male” and 2 for “female”. I have 
recoded it to 0 for “female” and 1 for “male”. Other than that it is unchanged. In figure 3-7 B) we 
can observe that there is a tiny overrepresentation of men in the population (50.36%). Because of 
this, the variable is skewed slightly towards the left, as can be observed in table 3-3. But since the 
kurtosis  does  not  deviate  too  far  from 3  (Midtbø 2012:  60),  which  is  the  value  that  indicates 
normality, I will use the measure as it is. 
Table 3-3: Descriptive stats for the control variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Number of obs. Skewness Kurtosis
Age 2.062385 2 .6520313 4905 -.0628228 2.343185
Gender 0.5035678 1 .5000382 4905 -.0142715 1.000204
Education 2.420004 3 .6853519 4469 -.7637841 2.406895
Income 629.7497 648.0741 252.0165 4126 .7165032 10.39939
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Education
As a measure for education I have used an original variable from the first wave of the Norwegian 
Citizens  Panel.  It  contains  three  categories,  and was  chosen because  the  adjusted wieghts  was 
adjusted to this variable, among others. In addition it gave fewer degrees of freedom, by having 
fewer categories. This measure is based on respondents reporting their highest completed education, 
and as figure  3-8 A) shows,  11% reported no education or primary school  only.  35% reported 
secondary school, and 53% reported completed education at college or university. 
In table 3-3 we can observe that the Gaussian distribution of the measure is slanting slightly to the 
left,  because  the  mean  is  somewhat  lower  than  the  median  (Midtbø  2012:  60),  but  since  the 
population in the dataset is quite large, this will not constitute a major problem (Midtbø 2012: 61). 
Figure 3-8:
A) Completed education                                          B) Squared transformation of income
Income
This variable constitues of self reported data from the respondents. It consists of how much the 
respondents claim to earn a year, before tax. The values here were quite spread out, and the kurtosis 
almost reached a value of 100 (see appendix to chapter 3). After a bit of testing, the best option 
seemed to be a square transformation. This lowered the kurtosis to a little over 10, as can be seen in 
table 3-3, so I settled for this.  
The average income, after the transformation is just under 630 000 NOK. The median is a little 
higher, which would normally indicate a slant to the left, but as we see the skewness is indicating a 
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slant to the right. This is probably due to a few very high values – as can be seen in figure 3-8 B), 
above. The box plot also indicates the quartiles of the distribution, along with the unusual values. 
And indeed there are quite a few values, marked by dots, that fall outside the “fences” of the figure. 
These dots indicate extreme values, and although there are extreme values on both sides of the 
figure, the most extreme are above the figure.
3.4 Multivariate regression analysis
3.4.1 A cross-sectional study 
Case studies are, perhaps, more often guided by a qualitative approach, but seeing as there is no 
antagonism between a case study and the use of a quantitative method, I have chosen the path of a 
cross-sectional analysis (Yin 2014: 19). Being interested in public opinion, which is most often 
studied through public opinion surveys that are representative of a population (see for instance 
Austgulen og Stø 2013, Lewandowsky et al. 2013, Leizerowits et al. 2012, Kahan et al. 2011), a 
quantitative approach is the best way to approach the research question, also considering the way 
my research question is posed (Yin 2014: 9-12).  
It would have been interesting to see how public opininon on the issue of climate change and the 
petroleum industry develops over time and, strictly speaking, one only need data from two points in 
time to conduct a longitudinal study (Skog 2010: 74). However, some of the variables I have chosen 
to work with are only part of the first wave. For instance, the second wave also contains media 
variables, but they measure different things (Ivarsflaten et al. 2015). It should be mentioned that the 
media variables in the second wave of the Norwegian Citizen Panel are more differentiated than the 
media  variables  I  have  chosen to  use.  Although a  few scholars  have  adviced  the  use  of  such 
differentiated variables (Newton 1999, Holtz-Bacha 1990), I have still decided to use these rather 
wide “catch all” variables. This choice is justified for reasons of causality: Some of my dependent 
variables only exist in the first wave (support for taxation of petroleum exploration and support for 
a general reduction of CO2 emissions), and logically a cause need to precede a consequence in time 
(Gerring 2012).  
3.4.2 Ordinary least square regression
I will use ordinary least square (OLS) regression as the method for two models, namely the ones 
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describing support  for  the proposed climate change mitigation  policies:  heavier  taxation of  the 
exploration activities  of  the  petroleum industries,  and a  reduction of  CO2 emissions. OLS is  a 
“method for obtaining estimates of regression equation coefficients that minimizes the error sum of 
squares.” (Knoke et al. 2002: 174). 
However, one of the preconditions for the use of OLS are the intervals between the categories on 
the dependent variable. Usually, a metric scale is preferable, but ordinal dependent variables can be 
used as well (Grønmo 2004: 314), particularily if there are several categories (6 or more) on the 
dependent variable that can be easily ranged (Midtbø 2007: 33). This made OLS regression possible 
for two out of the four models I will conduct.
If the results from an OLS regression model is to be valid, certain assumptions must be met. The  
model  must  be  homoscedastic,  the  residuals  of  the  model  must  be  normally  distributed  and 
uncorrelated with each other, and, since the OLS regression predicts linearity, the model must be 
linear (Midtbø 2012, Skog 2010). 
Homoscedasticity
The Breusch-Pagan test (BP) has been used to identify any heteroscedasticity (Midtbø 2012: 106-
110), and the results are displayed graphically in the appendix to this chapter. As can be seen there, 
the model describing the support for regulation of CO2 emissions suffers from this problem. The 
variance in the residuals are dependent on the variance of the values on the explanatory variables, 
meaning  that  the  ability  of  the  model  to  predict  the  outcome  varies  with  the  values  on  the 
explanatory variables (Midtbø 2012: 106-107). This is most likey due to a mis-spesification of the 
model (Midtbø 2012: 109). However, the model depicting the dependent variable of main concern – 
support  for  more  tax on the  petroleum exploration activities  –  passes  the BP-test.  Therefore,  I 
choose not to change the model specification, but instead rely on robust standard errors in the model  
where heteroscedasticity is a problem (Wooldridge 2009: 264).
Normally distributed residuals
There should be about equal chance of over-estimation as of under-estimation of the values in the 
models, therefore the distribution of the residuals should be symetrical (Midtbø 2012: 114). In the 
appendix  to  chapter  3,  these  distributions  are  showed  graphically.  The  residuals  in  the  model 
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depicting  support  for  regulation  of  CO2 emissions  are  not normally  distributed.  This  has 
consequences for the testing of hypotheses because the probability distribution of the parameter 
estimate will not follow the t-distribution (Skog 2010: 249). However, it is argued that this is not the  
most important assumption (Midtbø 2012: 114, Skog 2010: 250). 
Linearity  
To test the linearity assumption of the models I have used Ramsey's regression specification error 
test (RESET) and linktests (Midtbø 2012: 131). The simple RESET tests do not reject linearity for  
the models, but including the individual explanatory variables in the tests lead to rejection. The 
linktest was also ambiguous, as the test statistics are insignificant for both the predicted and the 
squared predicted values (Midtbø 2012: 131).
Lack of linearity may lead to misleading coefficients as well as misleading standard errors (Midtbø 
2012: 130). One possible avenue to try to rectify the models is to transform the variables. However, 
as I have showed above, there are no transformations that are a great fit. Therefore one must assume 
that the ambiguity is down the qualitative capacities of the dependent variables, and also of several  
of the explanatory variables. One may, therefore, find it fruitful to repeat these analyses with an 
ordinal logistic regression in the future (Fullerton 2009).
Multicollinearity
The models were tested for multicollinearity by using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), but this 
turned out not to be a problem. Resluts can be seen in the appendix to this chapter. 
3.4.3 Logistic regression
For the other two models still unaccounted for, worry about climate change and opinions about the 
Norwegian petroleum production rate, the method of choice is logistic regression.The goal with this 
analysis is the same as for the other two models: the best fitting, most parsimoneous, and clinically 
interpretable  model  that  describes  the  relationship  between  the  dependent  variable  and  the 
covariates I wish to investigate. However, there are differences between OLS and logistic regression 
in both the form of the model and the set of assumptions the model must fulfill (Hosmer et al. 2013: 
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1). The logit model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method, which estimate parameter 
values  that  chooses  the  set  with  the  highest  probability  of  generating  the  sample  observations 
(Knoke et al. 2002: 307).  
For the two remaining models I will apply the method of binary logistic regression, which rests on 
maximum  likelihood  estimation,  and  the  interpretation  of  the  model  is  in  the  form  predicted 
probabilities: odds and oddsratios, which basically means that we measure the effects in odds rather 
than probabilities. The odds and oddsratios measure the effect in relative terms rather than absolute 
terms (Skog 2010: 361-367). 
The logistic models also rest on some assumptions that must be fulfilled if the results are to be 
valid. The first is that the shape of the curve from the logistic model gives a correct image of the 
empirical relationship between the variables. For binary models this can be tested with the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test, which assume that the modeled shape is indeed a curve. If the test is significant, the 
assumption does not hold (Skog 2010: 380-381, 384). In this case the test statistic is not significant 
for any of the models, and the assumption holds.
The  second  assumption  deals  with  the  autonomy  of  the  observations.  I  am  conducting  cross-
sectional analyses, hence this assumption is, by definition, fulfilled (Skog 2010: 380).
At last, and analogous to the OLS method, it is assumed that there are not any underlying variables 
that are neither the cause of the dependent variable nor correlated with the explanatory variables 
(Skog 2010: 381). The variables and the methods chosen for this study rests on a firm and well 
documented  theoretical  framework,  which  reduces  the  chance  of  spuriousness  significantly.  In 
addition,  all  the  models  used  here,  are  multivariate.  This  reduces  the  risk  for  spuriousness 
significantly. Finally, there are, as I have showed above, no better functional form to the variables 
included in the analysis (Hosmer et al. 2013: 153). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test will, in multivariate 
cases, also reveal interaction effects by a significant test statistic (Skog 2010: 423). 
3.4.4. Bivariate tabulations and regressions 
After analysing the four models, I will compare the effects of the indepenent variables across the 
four models. In order to explain some of these effects, for instance if my theoretical framework do 
not readily explain the outcome, some bivariate regressions will be used. In these cases I will stick 
to  the  methods  already  accounted  for.  As  the  pitfalls  of  the  different  types  of  regressions  are 
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alreaddy discussed, the testing of the assumptions of these bivariate regressions can be seen in the 
tables presenting the result in chapter 4. 
3.5 Summary
This chapter has been used to present the data from the first wave of the Norwegian Citizen Panel.  
These data will be used in the four analysis I will present in the next chapter. The variables have  
also been operationalised, and some space have been used to describe each variable thoroughly. 
This  provides  a  better  understanding  for  the  methods  of  choice,  which  are  binary  logistic 
regressions  of  the two first  dependent  variables  presented here,  and OLS of  the  two last,  with 
particular  emphasis  on  the  variable  measuring  support  for  heavier  taxation  of  the  petroleum 
industry's exploration activities.   
The main concern here is to seek verification (or rejection) of the results from the model describing 
the support for taxation of the petroleum industry's exploration activities. Therefore, I will compare 
the results by the coefficients estimated in each model, and not the explained variance of the models 
which will not be directly comparable. I have also gone through the assumptions of each type of 





Media  influence  on  public  opinion  concerning  climate  change 
mitigation 
4.1 Introduction
I will conduct a four cross-sectional analysis in my search for answers to whether and how the news 
media influence public opinion on climate change mitigation policies - more specifically those that 
target the petroleum industry. As the strengths and weaknesses of the methods applied here are 
discussed in the previous chapter, the sole focus of this chapter will be the analysis, explaining the 
findings, and discussing their implications. First, I will go through each analysis in a rather matter-
of-fact fashion, creating a foundation for understanding by beginning with Norwegian worry about 
climate change, and opinions about the Norwegian petroleum production rate. Then I will move on 
to  the  mitigation  policies,  starting  with  the  model  describing  support  for  heavier  taxes  on  the 
exploration activities in the petroleum sector. In these sections I will explain, by refering to the 
theoretical  framework,  each phenomenon as it  appears in the given analysis.  At the end of the 
chapter I will tie the findings from each analysis together in order to answer the research question in 
chapter 5. 
4.2 Worry about climate change and news media use
As we have seen in the previous chapter, 82% percent – a large majority – of the respondents 
declare that they experience some level of worry about climate change. This worry has yet to be 
translated into political action, and many factors are affecting the lack of engagement. Among these 
are  political  perspectives  limited  to  four-year  periods  –  equaling  the  period  between  national 
elections, climate change as a non-engageing media issue, a political issue without impact, and a 
threat to the Norwegian economy – an economy that is dependent on the production of fossil fuels 
(Eide et al. 2014).
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4.2.1 A binary logistic regression of Worry about climate change
This analysis was conducted with a binary logistic regression. At first, I wished to conduct a OLS 
regression,  as the original variable was a 5 category ordinal variable.  This,  however,  proved to 
violate the linearity assumption, which is the most important assumption in OLS regression (Midtbø 
2012: 130). In such cases, a good alternative is to dichotomise the dependent variable and use a 
binary logistic regression instead (Skog 2010). Particularily in cases where the loss of information 
is not a great risk, which is the case here. This is also a quite common approach (Levi et al. 2009: 
361-362).
The  analysis  reported  here,  have  not  been  subject  to  weights.  The  co-ordinators  of  the  NCP 
recommended using weights that  adjusted for  bias in  the selected population  (Ivarsflaten  et  al. 
2014:  4-5,  Høgestøl  & Skjervheim 2013:  7-9).  I  conducted seperate  analyses with and without 
weights, which can be seen in the appendix to this chapter. I used a likelihood ratio test to make 
sure that there was no significant difference between the two models (Skog 2010: 375). 
The further assumptions of the binary logistic regression were discussed in the previous chapter. 
4.2.2 Findings
The  results  of  the  binary  logistic  regression  may  be  observed  in  table  4-1  below.  Since  the  
newsmedia variables are of particular interest here, I will present them first. 
The media
TV and national newspapers are the most important sources for news consumption about climate 
change (Eide  et.al.  2014: 11), and the social media Twitter had major impact on climate change 
demonstrations in England and Denmark (Segerberg & Bennett 2011).
As can be seen in table 4-1, respondents who frequently watch the TV-news are less likely to be  
worried about  climate change. When looking at  the two other media variables,  Twitter-use and 
newspaper reading, they have the opposite effect. Both of them are associated with being worried 
about climate change, and the association is stronger for reading the newspaper than it is for using 
Twitter.  Of all  three  media variables,  only  reading the  newspaper  has  a  statistically  significant 
impact  upon  the  level  of  worry  about  climate  change.  The  direction  of  the  coefficients  were 
anticipated  for  the  reading of  newspapers  and  twitter,  but  the  negative  impact  from TV news 
watching was not. This may, however, be explained by similar findings from the US in particular, 
but also the UK, where the negative effect of TV is known as «video malaise». Mutz (2007), for 
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instance, connects the negative effect watching TV news has on political trust to the way political  
debates are presented on TV. She shows how incivilities between participants and close up filming 
have a negative impact upon what people thought of the legitimacy of the views of the opposing 
side. 
Newton (1999) on the other hand shows that in the UK the problem mounts to spending a lot of  
time in front og the TV in general  that is the problem, whereas actually watching the TV news 
rendered more political mobilization. 
Although the empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive, it may be argued that Norwegians who 
are using the TV news to stay updated on the events of the world have less confidence in the  
political leadership, scientists and other authorities on the subject of climate change. It might also 
be probable that the negative impact from TV-news is related to the notion of motivated reasoning 
and climate change denial (Lewandowsky et al. 2013, Kahan et al. 2011 Nordgaard 2011). Perhaps 
climate change is treated differently on TV than it is in Norwegian newspapers, and allows people 
who are already sceptical towards the phenomenon to continue their motivated thinking in terms of 
climate change. This issue should be pursued in future research, but falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
It should also be noted that this general measure of TV news use, may be interpreted differently  
among the respondents. Some may include political debates over current issues and other programs 
that cover current issues in an educational or humorous way, but which do not necessarily constitue 
a news broadcast in the traditonal sense. 
Trust
Three measures of trust were included in the model. The variables measure trust in the government, 
interpersonal trust and whether one believes that it is possible to influence politics outside elections. 
The latter may be seen as a proxy for a more general trust in the functioning of the Norwegian 
democracy. 
Low trust in the government is associated with a higher level of worry. This effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The effect is not anticipated, but can be explained readily enough: This 
may happen for two reasons: On the one hand, and independent  of ruling party, it  may be the  
expression of a general lack of confidence in political institutions or politicians. On the other hand, 
and more plausible, it is possible that people who worry about climate change vote for parties that 
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are  currently  in  the  opposition.  The  litterature  points  to  a  quite  distinct  cleavage  between  the 
political left and the political right on the issue of climate change, where the right is significantly 
less  concerned about  climate  change,  both  in  terms of  its  existence  and its  human component 
(Austgulen & Stø 2013, Kahan et al. 2011). Mutz' (2007) findings, as they were discussed above, 
points in this direction. In addition, Braithwaite (1998) shows how different trust norms are tied to 
different sets of values – security and harmony values – and that the political right relies more on 
security values and thus more often apply exchange trust norms. The political left are more prone to 
hold harmony values, and rely on communal trust norms more often (Braithwaite 1998: 67-68).
Interpersonal trust had a positive, and barely statistially significant effect upon how much people 
worry  about  climate  change.  This  was  anticipated.  Trusting  people  would  be  more  inclined  to 
believe in climate science, and would also believe that solutions to this problem will  be found. 
Since  climate  change is  seen as  a  collective action  problem, and trust  is  needed to  "organise" 
collective action, this effect could be regarded as a normatively positive one (Tvinnereim 2013, 
Rothstein  2013).  As  we  saw  in  chapter  2  of  this  thesis,  reciprocity  seem  to  be  an  important 
condition  for  the  alleviation of  collective  action problems as  it  helps  build trust  (Kahan 2003, 
Rothstein 2000). Reciprocity seem to be important to Norwegians, as Tvinnereim and Lachapelle 
(2014) have demonstrated. 
The measure included for believing that one can only influence politics through elections shows a 
negative impact upon the dependent variable, meaning that people who do believe that elections are 
the only means by which to influence politics tend to be less worried about climate change. This  
was anticipated. Although high levels of interpersonal trust exists (see Chapter 3, and Rothstein & 
Uslaner 2005: 42), there seems to be little trust in the influence of the collectivity in other respects. 
The belief that one is unable to influence politics outside elections in a democracy may be tied to 
the respondents level of education, which could explain why it has a negative impact upon the level 
of worry about climate change Because people with higher education also tend to be more worried 
about climate change. I will return to this issue below.  
Politics
As expected, respondents who voted centre-left in the last parliamentary election are more worried 
about climate change than those who voted centre-right. The effect is thus positive, and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Due to the parliamentary agreement among the Norwegian political 
parties (save the Progress party) (Regjeringen 2012), I expected this effect to be non-significant – 
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although the direction of the coefficients are as expected. I also expected the effect to be weaker 
than what the model stipulates because the Labour party, which is a leftist party, traditionally has 
never  emphasised  environmental  protection.  Rather,  after  the  second  world  war  they  have 
advocated industrial interests, albeit for the benefit of the worker. In more recent years, the Labour 
party is positive to the opening of new areas to petroleum production in the arctic, although at the 
same time work for renewable energy industries  (Arbeiderpartiet 2015a, Arbeiderpartiet 2015b, 
Asdal 2011).
As outlined in chapter  2,  evidence of significant  political  cleavage regarding the existence and 
causes  of  global  warming  and  climate  change  have  emerged  over  the  years.  Evidence  of 
polarization is particlarly strong in the US, where republicans are significantly less likely to believe 
in the existence of climate change and that it is caused by human activity (McCright & Dunlap 
2011). Scientists have reached a consensus on the issue of climate change, yet this realisation is 
often undercommunicated or rejected by conservative parties. Some scientific evidence points to 
motivated reasoning as the cause of this cleavage. Essentially this means that people who vote for 
conservative parties are more likely to not believe in climate change because it is more suitable in 
their overall world view. This is also closely related to what the consequences of climate change as 
a real phenomenon might be (Austgulen & Stø 2013, Lewandowsky et al. 2013)
Controls
Three out of the four control variables show statistically significant impacts at the 1% level on the 
dependent variable. As expected, women are more worried about climate change than men, and 
respondents with more education also state that they are worried about climate change. Respondents 
who claim to have earn more, are also less likely to worry about climate change. This is in line with 
theoretical stipulation (McCright & Dunlap 2011, Hamilton 2011, Poortinga  et al.  2011).  Older 
people actually turn out to be more worried about climate change than younger people in Norway, 
which is contrary to results from other scientific investigations (Poortinga et al. 2011, Hamilton 
2011), and thus my expectations. One explanation may be “climate change fatigue” where younger 
people experience that the action at  the political  level and by other people in  society (perhaps 
including  themselves  and their  friends)  does  not  match  the  seriousness  of  the  threat  posed  by 
climate change as it is portrayed in the Norwegian newspapers (Duarte 2010), and thus they believe 
that nothing can be done about the issue. Younger people may wish to keep the issue at an arms 
length,  resulting  in  the  collective  organization  of  denial  (Norgaard  2011).  This  reinforces  the 
argument about reciprocity, and shows why it is important: If people would readily believe that their  
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actions mattered in a joint effort, it  is more likely that people would participate (Tvinnereim & 
Lachapelle 2014, Kahan 2003).
Table 4-1: Worry about climate change, and opinions about production rate
Dependent variable Worry about climate change Reduce or increase petroleum production
N 3003 2987
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.10
Log likelihood -1236.97 -1848.19
LR chi2 (11) 230.52 (11) 408.61
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
TV -0.08 0.174 0.24 0.000***
Twitter 0.05 0.425 -0.13 0.005***
Paper 0.16 0.004*** -0.12 0.008***
Trust in government -0.13 0.006*** 0.26 0.000***
Interpersonal Trust 0.04 0.097* -0.06 0.003***
Political influence -0.12 0.000*** 0.13 0.000***
Political view 0.34 0.000*** -0.30 0.000***
Age 0.31 0.001*** -0.34 0.000***
Gender -0.87 0.000*** 0.49 0.000***
Education 0.31 0.000*** -0.37 0.000***
Income -0.00 0.675 0.00 0.000***
Constant 0.74 0.106 -0.05 0.88
P < 0.01*** p < 0.05** p < 0.1*
4.3 Reduce or increase petroleum production and news media influence
In the previous chapters, we learned that the petroleum industry is not only very important in the 
Norwegian  economy,  but  also  that  it  has  a  significant  cultural  impact  and  that  it  may  affect  
Norwegians' perception of climate change and other issues pertaining to climate change (Hornmoen 
2014, Naper 2014, Norgaard 2011). Although the primary objective here is to assess media impact 
on the public opinion on taxation of the petroleum industry as a means to mitigate climate change, it  
is easier to do so if we have some knowledge about what the population think of the petroleum 
67
industry in relation to climate change.
4.3.1 A binary logistic regression of Opinions about the Norwegian petroleum production rate
Here, I use a measure of whether people think the petroleum production rate should be reduced, 
increased or kept as it is, as the dependent variable. This measure has, as outlined in chapter 3, been 
dichotomised. Loss of information was, in this case not a great  risk,  and  the approach is  quite 
common with variables of a similar kind (Levi et al. 2009: 361-362).
I do not used weights in this analysis, although such an approach was recommended in order to 
adjust for bias in the selected population (Ivarsflaten et al. 2014: 4-5, Høgestøl & Skjervheim 2013: 
7-9). I do, however, conduct seperate analysis with and without weights, which can be seen in the 
appendix to this chapter. The likelihood-ratio test is applied to make sure that there is no significant  
difference  between  the  weighted  and  the  unweighted  models  (Skog  2010:  375).  The  further 
assumptions of the binary logistic regression were discussed in the previous chapter. 
4.3.2 Findings
The  results  from  the  logistic  regression  of  what  the  respondents  think  about  the  petroleum 
production rate shows diverging results from the regression with Worry about climate change as the 
dependent variable. Again, the media variables are of particular interest, so I will start with them. 
Results are presented in table 4-1 above.
The media
All three media variables have a statistically significant impact at the 1% level on the dependent 
variable. Using TV-news for a news update has strong positive effect on whether people think that a 
reduction or an increase of Norwegian petroleum production is in order. This means that people 
who watch TV-news are more likely to think that the production rate should stay as it is or increase. 
This effect is anticipated. 
The negative effect of Twitter use – meaning that the respondents who rely on this medium want a 
reduction of the petroleum production rate – is also as expected, although perhaps a little stronger 
than  anticipated  due  to  the  limited  number  of  respondents  who  actually  uses  the  medium. 
Respondents who rely on reading newspapers for their news consumption, however, are also more 
likely  to  be  wanting  a  decrease  in  the  petroleum  production  rate.  This  is  contrary  to  my 
expectations.    
68
These findings do not lend much support for the «video malaise» explanation on their own, but the 
petroleum industry enjoys a peculiarly high status in Norway, and this cultural phenomenon may 
influence peoples minds more than alleged televised attack journalism (McCombs et al. 2011: 100-
108). It may also be the case that the petroleum industry is not "under attack", so to speak. This is, 
at least, possible to test empirically, but it falls outside the scope of this thesis.
Trust
The trust variables show diverging effects also in this analysis, but the effects are opposite of the 
effects in the previous analysis. High trust in the government is associated with supporting status 
quo or increasing the petroleum production rate on the Norwegian continental shelf, and the effect 
is statistically significant. This may happen for two reasons: On the one hand, and independent of 
ruling party, it may be an expression of confidence in the political institutions (Levi et al. 2009). On 
the other hand, we do have a liberal-conservative government in Norway at the moment. Economic 
growth, expansion of the petroleum sector and a reduction of public expenses are important to these 
parties (Fremskrittspartiet 2015, Høyre 2014, Høyre 2008). It is possible that the people who places 
a lot of trust in the government are sharing these views. This possibility is supported to some extent 
by  the  notion  of  different  trust  norms  as  related  to  values  that  are  to  some  extent  political 
(Braithwaite 1998: 67-68). 
This renders trust important in the equation of policymaking on climate change, because it may 
explain why it is so difficult to convince someone who are motivated in their reasoning, since the 
value base we build our trust upon is profound – we are socialized into these ways of thinking from 
we are children (Braithwaite 1998: 47-51). It takes time to change peoples opinion on an issue, 
particularily if recognizing this issue threatens ones life as one knows it (Norgaard 2011, Clark & 
York 2005). We must also remember that climate change was not a very important issue in the last 
parliamentary election in  Norway,  although it  became more important  than most  of  the parties 
bargained for (Gloppen et al. 2014). Being aware of a problem does not entail that one recognizes 
ones own part in causing the problem – although we might be seeing this starting to change here. 
Interpersonal trust has a negative and statistically significant effect upon the dependent variable. 
People who report high levels of trust in others are more inclined to think that the rate of petroleum 
production on Norwegian territory should be reduced. This effect is most likely due to the fact that 
82% of the respondents are worried about climate change at one level or other. From this we may 
deduce  that  they  also  believe  in  global  warming,  and  thus  realizes  the  need  to  reduce  the 
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consumtion of petroleum products and fossil fuels in general.
On the other hand, this also means that people who are more sceptical of other peoples intentions 
tend to want the Norwegian petroleum production to stay as it is or increase. These findings also fit 
with  Braithwaites  (1998:  49)  notion  of  exchange  vs.  communal  trust  norms.  People  with  a 
propensity  for  relying  on  exchange  trust  norms,  would,  most  likely,  also  emphasise  economic 
growth,  authority  and competitiveness.  They would,  perhaps,  also  be  more  inclined to  demand 
reciprocity, as in “others must reduce their petroleum production rate if we are to do it too” (Kahan 
2003). 
The last trust variable, which is measuring whether people believe that the only way to influence 
politics  is  through elections,  has  a  positive  and statistically significant  effect  on the  dependent 
variable. People who do believe that elections are the only way to affect politics also tend to think 
that the petroleum production should be kept at todays level or increase. The belief  that one is  
unable to influence politics outside elections in a democracy may be tied to the respondents level of 
education. I will return to this issue in the last part of this chapter. On the other hand, as climate 
change has become a politicized issue, although less so, perhaps, than in the US (Austgulen & Stø 
2013), and the lack of confidence in ones own ability to influence politics may point to some sort of 
fatalism regarding the democratic system. The issue of climate change has been in the state of 
relative grid lock in national as well as international politics for the good part of the last 25 years. It 
is  likely  that  this  will  affect  peoples  faith  in  the  political  system,  as  it  hampers  the  political  
efficiency (Levi et al. 2009). Again, this may also be affected by media representations, such as the 
in-your-face theory of Mutz (2007).   
Politics
We may observe in table 4-1 above, that the respondents are politically polarised when it comes to 
whether the production of petroleum should be reduced or increased. The voting behaviour variable 
have a strong, significant negative impact upon the dependent variable, meaning that voters leaning 
towards the right are more positive to keep the production rate as it is or increase it. Left-leaning 
voters, on the other hand are more likely to want a reduction.
With the significance of the petroleum industry in the Norwegian economy in mind, it is possible to 
relate this to how much weight the political parties asign to climate change. The more plausible 
explanation,  however,  is  the political  debate about  petroleum production in the area around the 
Lofoten islands, Vesterålen and Senja. This debate has evoked a tremendous engagement at the 
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grasroot, and have resulted in a political decision to not exploit the petroleum resources in this area, 
at  least  for  now (Regjeringen 2014).  The  political  image is  roughly  the  same as  with  climate 
change: Leftist parties, in collaboration with the christian democrats (KrF), the Liberals (V) and the 
Centre party (Sp) are working for a definate protection of the area, whereas the Right, Progress and 
to some extent Labour is working for industrial development (Høyre 2014, Fremskrittspartiet 2015, 
Arbeiderpartiet 2015a).
With regards to Labour, I say to some extent, because the party has supported drilling for petroleum 
in these areas, but strong forces within the party, particularly its youth party, are trying to make 
Labour  go  for  a  green  development  rather  than  the  petroleum  option  (Arbeiderpartiet  2015a, 
Arbeiderpartiet  2015b).  Although  petroleum production  is  related  to  climate  change,  especially 
through its consumption, I doubt that people generally think of the long term consequences when 
asked to contemplate the issue of reduction versus increase of petroleum production. I believe it is 
the short and long term local environmental consequences in the Lofoten islands, Vesterålen and 
Senja  people  have  mind  when  answering  this  particular  question,  because  this  is  where  the 
emphasis have been placed in the communication of the issue in the mass media (NRK 2015). The 
issue of protecting these areas is a salient media issue, and it is possible to argue that it is a cultural 
clash as well as a political one: The serenity and picturesque nature as an image of the Norwegian 
«living close to nature» way of life versus the hardworking, brave Norwegians who defied big 
international petroleum companies in a cunning way, grew rich and use the wealth to benefit all 
Norwegians (Norgaard 2011).
Controls
All the control variables show strong, statistically significant impacts on whether the petroleum 
production rate should be increased, stay at the current level, or be reduced. Age has a negative 
impact  on the dependent  variable,  meaning that  older people  are  more  likely  to  think  that  the 
production rate should be reduced. This is  unexpected,  as earlier  research have found that it  is 
generally younger people who are worried about climate change and general environmental issues, 
whereas older people tend to care less (Poortinga  et al. 2011, Hamilton 2011). The effects of the 
other control variables are as expected (Poortinga  et al. 2011, Hamilton 2011). Gender is a very 
important predictor, in this case it  has a positive impact indicating that men are more likely to 
support status quo or an increase in the petroleum production rate than women. People with more 
education are more likely to support a reduction in the production rate, whereas people with a 
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higher income are more prone to support the current state of affairs or an increase.
4.4 Support for heavier tax on the petroleum industry's exploration activities
As we remember from chapter 2, income from petroleum related activity is subject to ordinary 
business tax, which is 27%. In addition, a special tax on income from extraction, processing, and 
pipe transport is to be payed to the state. Totally, the tax rate for the exploration and extraction 
companies operating in Norway is 78% (KPMG 2015). This have not hindered investments on 
Norwegian territory, and a higher tax on exploration may generate higher income for the Norwegian 
state.  However,  it  has  also  been  argued  that  a  higher  tax  rate  will  prohibit  companies  from 
investments when the oilprice is low, which may have negative effect on the economy as a whole.  
Even if  the petroleum sector is extremly important in the Norwegian economy, it  has not  been 
exempt from the pricing of CO2 emissions, as other, land based, industries have been (Gullberg & 
Skodvin 2011: 123). 
4.4.1 An OLS analysis of support for an increased petroleum tax rate
This analysis was conducted with a regular ordinary least square (OLS) regression of an ordinal 
dependent variable. As outlined in chapter 3, this is possible when there are 6 or more categories on 
the  dependent  variable.  This  model  is  both  homoscedastic,  and  normally  distributed,  and  also 
passed a RESET test.
The analysis reported here, have not been subject to weights. Based on recommendations from the 
co-ordinators  of  the  NCP (Ivarsflaten  et  al.  2014:  4-5,  Høgestøl  &  Skjervheim  2013:  7-9),  I 
conducted a quick analysis where I compared the results from models with and without weights. 
These can be seen in the appendix. 
4.4.2 Findings
Since the primary objective is to assess the impact of various news media on the support for further  
taxation  of  the  petroleum  industry  as  a  climate  mitigation  policy,  the  media  variables  are  of 
particular interest here. The results may be seen in table 4-2 below. 
72
The Media
All the media variables are statistically significant, albeit their effects go in different directions, and 
vary in strength. TV-use had the strongest effect upon the dependent variable, and this effect was 
negative. This means that respondents who use TV as their main source of news are less likely to 
support further taxation of the petroleum industry. Twitter-use and reading the newspaper had the 
opposite effect. Both of them are associated with the support of a higher tax rate, although the 
association is stronger for Twitter. 
The strength and direction of  the  coefficients  are  as  anticipated for  Twitter-use and newspaper 
reading. As we have seen, Norwegian newspapers are mostly covering climate change is a manner 
consistent with the scientific consensus (Duarte 2010), which may lead to more support for the 
proposed tax. In addiotion, newspaper reading have a tendency to build trust (Brehm & Rahn 1997), 
which  is,  as  we  have  seen,  important  in  mounting  collective  action  (Kahan  2003).  Similarily, 
Twitter  is  known to have been used by environmental activists to rally for  collective  action in 
relation to the climate change issue (Segerberg & Bennett 2011). 
The negative impact from TV-news use is somewhat unexpected. It may be explained by the notion 
of «video malaise»: Mutz (2007) has showed that how political issues are being represented on TV, 
particularily in political debates, influence peoples perception of the legitimacy of the opposing 
view. Newton (1999) has also elaborated on the notion of video malaise, but he finds that watching 
TV in general has a detrimental effect upon political mobilization, so not quite the same. However, I  
think it is fruitful to look for other explanations, as the theory of video malaise is not consistently 
proved across my models.  
Trust
The variable measuring trust in the government is statistically significant and negative. Meaning 
that people who trust the government are more sceptical of the proposed tax. This can readilly be 
explained away as a political issue: The current Norwegian government is conservative, thus poeple 
who trust it would probably support their politics and also share their view on taxation. However,  
the  measure  for  interpersonal  trust  have  a  statistically  significant  positive  impact  upon  the 
dependent variable, meaning higher levels of trust is associated with higher levels of support for the 
proposed tax. 
In a climate change context this is interesting. Seeing these findings together may suggest that trust 
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in the government and interpersonal trust is grounded in different trust norms (Braithwaite 1998), 
meaning that political trust is more of an exchange, and thus rests on a security value base, whereas 
trusting a stranger on the street is more built on communal trust norms. I will return to this at the 
end of the chapter, when I compare findings across models. 
The measure of whether people think voting is the only way to influence politics has a negative 
effect on the dependent variable, and the effect is statistically significant. In essense it means that 
those who support further taxes on the petroleum industry also tend to believe that it is possible to  
influence the political process outside elections. 
Politics
People voting for left-leaning parties are more likely to support of the proposed tax. This is hardly 
surprising, as leftist parties are more fond of taxation as a political instrument in the first place. 
Also,  since  these  questions were  asked in  a  context  of  climate  change mitigation  efforts,  it  is 
possible that this has contributed to a poltical polarization along the lines seen in the anglo-saxon 
countries (Levandowsky et al. 2013, Austgulen & Stø 2013, McCright & Dunlap 2011).
Controls
All the control variables have statistically significant impacts upon the dependent variable. Age is 
positively associated with the dependent variable, meaning that older people are more supportive 
the proposed tax. Again, this is unexpected given previous research (Poortinga et al. 2011, Hamilton 
2011). 
Gender has a negative impact upon the dependent variable, as expected. This means that women 
tend to support the proposed tax more than men do, and it is most likely due to the fact that women 
are more worried about climate change than men (see table 4-1, Hamilton 2011). 
As anticipated, higher education is associeted with a higher level of support for the proposed tax. 
Again, this effect is most likely due to the fact that people with higher education are more worried  
about climate change (see table 4-1, Poortinga et al. 2011). 
People who earn more tend to be unsupportive of the tax. People who are better educated also tend 
to earn more, but with these findings one could muse whether higher income is also related to ones 
political views. I will not pursue this notion, however.
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Table 4-2: Support for proposed mitigation policies
Dependent variable Support for further taxation of 
petroleum exploration




Adjusted r2 0.14 -
Standard error +1.37 +1.18
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
TV -0.17 0.00*** -0.05 0.228
Twitter 0.14 0.00*** 0.07 0.056*
Paper 0.11 0.00*** 0.08 0.017**
Trust in government -0.12 0.00*** 0.01 0.819
Interpersonal trust 0.06 0.00*** 0.04 0.051*
Political influence -0.08 0.00*** -0.06 0.002***
Political view 0.24 0.00*** 0.15 0.000***
Age 0.18 0.01*** 0.04 0.522
Gender -0.38 0.00*** -0.46 0.000***
Education 0.20 0.00*** 0.21 0.009***
Income -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.182
Weight 0.12 0.099*
Constant +4.11 0.00*** +4.50 0.000***
P < 0.01*** p < 0.05** p < 0.1*
4.5 Support for regulation of CO2 emissions
As stated earlier, the number one objective in this thesis is to probe the relationship between the  
news media and climate change mitigation policies targeting the petroleum industry. However, it is 
useful to also probe the relationship between other mitigation policy proposals and the news media. 
As a means to see if there are differences in public perception between different types of policies 
this may prove important with regard to future policy making, although two analyses are not enough 
to draw firm conclusions. In addition an analysis of one other policy proposal may shed more light 
on the main research question.
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4.5.1 An OLS analysis of support for regulation of CO2 emissions
This  analysis  was  also  conducted  with  a  regular  ordinary  least  square  (OLS)  regression.  The 
regulation variable has 7 independent categories, ranging from no support to very much support for 
regulation of emissions. In this case, it has proved somewhat difficult as the initial model was both 
heteroscedastic,  indicating  a  mis-specification,  and  deviated  from  the  normal  distribution.  As 
outlined  in  chapter  3,  the  first  problem was  solved  by using  robust  standard  errors,  since  the 
specification of the model could not be changed due to the fact that the theoretical framework is set 
– targeting the model presented in section 4.4. The deviation from normality is ignored (Midtbø 
2012: 114, see appendix).
The  analysis  reported  here,  has  been  subjected  to  weights.  The  co-ordinators  of  the  NCP 
recommended using weights that  adjusted for  bias in  the selected population  (Ivarsflaten  et  al. 
2014: 4-5). In this case, the added weight variable was statistically significant (see appendix to this 
chapter), albeit just barely. I choose, therefore, to use weights in this analysis. 
4.5.2 Findings
As can be observed in table 4-2 above, there seems to be a number of differences between the two 
policy proposals analysed. Since the media variables are of particular concern, I will again let those 
be the point of departure.
The Media
Here, the TV-news watching has a negative, but non-significant effect upon the dependent variable. 
This means that people who use TV for their news update are more likely to be unsupportive of the 
proposed policy, but that this effect is not particularly strong. Respondents who use Twitter and read 
newspapers  to stay updated on the news are more likely to be positive toward the the proposed 
policy, and these effects are statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
Again, the direction of the coefficients lends some support to the notion of "video malaise", in the 
way the term is deployed by Mutz (2007). The effects of all the media variables are weaker in this  
case, which may indicate that the issue of regulation of CO2 emissions is less salient in the media, 
perhaps particularily on the TV-news, when compared to the issue of the petroleum tax. On the 
other hand, the issue may not be less salient in the media since, after all, the press and people active 
on Twitter are supportive of this kind of policy. It may very well be the case that issues pertaining to 
the petroleum industry raise peoples engagement to a larger extent, than a general reduction of CO2 
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emissions among the land based industries. It may also be the case that since “everybody” knows 
that emissions must be reduced, the issue is not contentious enough for a “good story” (Boykoff & 
Boykoff 2007).
Trust
The variable measuring trust in the government has a positive, but neglible effect. Meaning that 
people who trust the government do have a slight tendency to be supportive of the regulation of CO2 
emission. Interpersonal trust, on the other hand, is of more importance. The marginally statistically 
significant postive effect shows that people who believe that other people can be trusted, are more 
likely to favour the proposed policy of regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. This finding verifies 
the importance of interpersonal trust in relation to climate change policy issues. Rothstein & Stolle 
(2008) show how institutions matters to the creation of social capital and social trust. In this case, it 
seems that social  trust  may be important  in the establishment of legitimate policies on climate 
change.     
The variable measuring whether people believe that voting is the only means of influencing politics 
is negatively associated with the dependent variable, meaning that respondents who do think that 
voting is the only way to influence politics are more likely to be unsupportive of the proposed 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. This effect is statistically significant, and slightly peculiar: 
The lack of support may be regarded as an uncooperative attitude on behalf of the respondents,  
which could be the result of little trust in democratic instituions. If the trust-relationship between the  
citizens and the government is one of exchange (Braithwaite 1998) it is, in a sense, one of give and 
take. If the citizens feel they get nothing, they will not give anything (Kahan 2003). 
Politics
The variable measuring political affiliation turns out to be very important in this case.  It  has a 
statistically significant positive effect upon the dependent variable – meaning that people who voted 
for  independent  and/or  leftist  parties  are  more  inclined  to  support  the  proposed  regulation  of 
greenhouse gas emissions. This is entirely in line with my expectations (see for instance Austgulen 
& Stø 2013). Independent and left leaning voters seem to percieve greater urgency in relation to 
climate change, and it  is likely that they will  be more supportive of policies or legislation that 
concerns climate change mitigation. Regardless, it seems, of the policy targets.
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Controls
There is a positive association between age and the dependent variable, meaning that older people 
tend  to  be  more  supportive  of  the  proposed  policy.  However,  this  effect  is  not  statistically 
significant, so age matters less in this case than it does in the other three analyses. 
Again, women tend to be more supportive of the proposed policy, than men. Respondents with more 
education are also more likely to support a reduction of CO2 emissions in landbased industry. Both 
of these variables have a statistically significant impact upon the dependent variable.
Respondents who report a higher income are more likely to be unsupportive of the proposed policy 
to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases, but in this case the effect is not statistically significant.  
From this, I gather that income is not an important in the prediction of support for regulation of CO2 
emissions.
4.6 Combining the findings
The purpose of all of the analysis above have been to investigate how the Norwegian public opinion 
on climate change mitigation policies targeting the petroleum industry are influenced by media use. 
In this section I will go through the analyses again, but this time I aim for a comparison across the 
models that will provide some answers to the research question. Such comparison is possible, when 
the models are made from the same sample of indiviuals, and I can compare the coefficients of the 
models, rather than the fit of the models. If there is consistency across the models, it strengthens the 
findings substantially, although I would still be careful with regards to making inferences to other 
countries. As mentioned, Norway became the case of choice, because it singles out – in more than 
one capacity (Gerring 2007: 115-122). This is cross-sectional analysis. It may be possible to draw 
firmer conclusions based on a panel-analysis or a time series, which will probably be possible in the 
future, as the Norwegian Citizen Panel project is ongoing. 
In the following, I will go through the analyses and findings theme by theme, beginning with the 
media. 
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4.6.1 The media  
Watching the TV-news
As we have seen in the analyses above, there are quite consistent findings across the models when it 
comes to the media variables: People who have answered that they use the TV news often (several 
times  a  week  or  more),  are  more  likely  to  be  unsupportive  of  the  suggested  climate  change 
mitigation policies, particularly the one that specifically targets the petroleum industry. Respondents 
who rely on television news are also less worried about climate change, although this effect was of 
less importance in that particular model. In addition, when considering the last analysis where the 
attitudes toward the decrease or increase of petroleum production was mapped out, we can observe 
in table 4-1 that using the TV to stay updated on the news had a statistically significant  positive 
effect upon the dependent variable, meaning that those who often use TV as a news source are more 
likely to favour status quo or an increase in the Norwegian petroleum production rate. 
These findings largely reject my first hypothesis – The use of TV news to stay updated on the news  
will have a positive effect on all the dependent variables –  as this variable only have a positive 
effect in the instance regarding the petroleum production rate.  
Taken together, these models show that using the TV as a news source on a daily basis seem to 
contribute to scepticism with regard to climate change. The respondents are less worried about 
climate change, and they are less supportive of mitigation policies. This  may be an incidence of 
“video malaise”, a term originally coined by Michael J. Robinson in the 1970s (Holtz-Bacha 1990: 
73), which means that watching television news have a negative impact on peoples opinion on 
democratic ideals and participation, and that they become increasingly cynical and skeptic toward 
politics and the government. Furthermore, coverage of news has become more sensationalistic and 
negative,  and  strategies  towards  winning  has  become  more  important  than  the  issue  at  hand 
(McCombs et al. 2011: 106-107, Newton 1999: 577-578). 
However, the video malaise theory has been contested – especially in terms of how the research it 
rests on have been conducted (Holtz-Bacha 1990: 74-75), but also in terms of contradictory findings 
(Newton 1999: 580). So although the video malaise theory seems like a plausible explanation in this  
case, we cannot accept it without considering some alternatives, and there are a couple of important 
things in my analyses that ought to be accounted for. Firstly, in the model where the respondents 
opinion on the Norwegian petroleum production rate was investigated, exposure to TV-news had a 
positive effect. If the video malaise theory was true, one would expect TV-news exposure to have a 
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negative effect regardless of issue. This is evidently not the case. Secondly, the direction of the 
coefficients are remarkably consistent: They are negative in the models directly related to climate 
change, but positive for the one concerning the petroleum industry. This suggests that, perhaps, 
framing and priming of these issues are different on the TV-news than it is in the papers. Boykoff  
(2008) have found that 70% of TV-news broadcasts  in the US are balanced in its reporting on 
climate change. The situation may be similar in Norway, but this is an empirical matter that falls  
outside the scope of  this thesis. The findings suggests, however, that TV news are an important 
influence with regards to news about the petroleum industry.
It is important to note that this variable only accounts for TV news use. In terms of terminological  
validity (Skog 2010: 89-90). It does not give any insights into what kind of news programs people 
are whatching – that is whether they are watching the evening news, in-depth documentaries on 
current issues, or humour shows picking at current issues in a satirical way – or give a definition as 
to what constitue a “news program”. Thus, even as this variable proves to have an impact on the 
matter at hand, nothing can be said as to the effect various types of news programs have on peoples  
opinion. Some research has been conducted on this in the US and the UK (Mutz 2007, Newton 
1999), but based on my data I cannot infere that such is the case in Norway. Further research on TV-
news content is necessary.
Reading the newspaper
People who read newspapers are more likely to be worried about climate change, and they are more 
likely to support mitigation efforts, regardless of whether it targets the petroleum industry or not. 
Newspaper readers are also more likely to favour a decrease in the petroleum production rate. This 
variable was statistically significant in all the models, but less so in the model that describes support 
for general regulation of CO2 emissions, see tables 4-1 and 4-2 above. 
These findings largely confirm hypothesis 2 -  Reading the newspaper will have a positive impact  
upon all the dependent variables – except with regards to the model describing the support for level 
of petroleum production. 
However, it is a bit of a puzzle that the difference between TV news use and newspaper reading 
should be so conspicuous. It implies that there are either rather large differences between readers 
and viewers as groups, or that there are differences in the way that the press and television news 
frame and prime their issues. Considering the gatekeeping functions of the media, it may also imply 
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differences in which issues are actually put on screen and in press, and which issues that will not 
make the final cut. There exist some support for the first implication, namely that there are socio-
demographic differences between readers and viewers. Newton (1999) found that among Britons, a 
number of socio-demographic variables impacted upon the exposure to TV news and broadsheet 
newspaper, among them age, gender, education and income. I will return to this in a bit.
The second implication is also plausible. Although we should not accept the notion of video malaise 
at face value, it is none the less true that the mass media have changed substantially over the past 
few years. Competition has increased, and it is a constant race to provide news consumers with the 
freshest stories. Moreover, the world has been shrinking, leaving each editor with more possible 
news stories to choose from, but not more time on the evening news or more pages in the news 
paper.  The  internet  is  also  contributing  to  this  fast  forward  exchange  of  news  stories  –  thus 
providing  the  consumers  only  with  bits  and  pieces,  not  in  depth  knowledge  about  and  issue 
(McCombs et al. 2011: Chapter 1). 
The third implication also seem to be relevant here: With regards to the press, there exist substantial 
evidence with regard to the editorial powers (Naper 2014, Eide & Naper 2014, Carvalho 2007). It  
seems fair to assume that the editorial pressure is no less in a television news room. It is quite  
possible that the issue of climate change is squeezed out by news stories that are more tangible (i.e.  
not how global warming will impact Bangladesh in a 100 years), and will fit into a two minute time 
frame (i.e. not an issue that requires some explanation of scientific research first). 
I believe all of the above to be plausible explanations as to the different impact these two variables 
have, although I believe that the most fruitful way to proceed is through scrutiny and comparison of 
content in the news of various TV-channels and various newspaper. Possibly also with a distinction 
between the  tabloid  press  and the broadsheet  press.  It  is  important  to  note  that  my newspaper 
variable does not differentiate between different kinds of newspapers, say tabloids and broadsheets. 
For a later analysis, such a distinction may prove very informative (Newton 1999).         
Twitter
Twitter have the same impact upon the dependent variables as newspapers, at least when it comes to 
the direction of the coefficients, meaning that Twitter users are more likely to be worried about 
climate change (table 4-1) and support both of the suggested mitigation policies (table 4-2). Twitter 
users are also more likely to want a decrease in the Norwegian petroleum production rate (table 4-
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1).  The use of Twitter  has  a  statistically  significant  impact  in  three of  the four  models,  but  to 
differing degrees, as discussed above. 
This  renders  my third  hypothesis  –  Twitter-use  has  a  positive  impact  on  worry  about  climate  
change and support for the proposed mitigation policies. It will have a negative impact on opinions  
regarding the petroleum production rate – true. 
Taken together, these three media variables suggest that there are differences in how different media 
– namely TV on the one hand side, and newspapers and twitter on the other – are framing and 
priming news that relates to climate change. The significant impact of Twitter, suggest that even a 
rather small segment of the overall media world may have a strong impact upon what people think. 
As a social medium, it's use is probably more about making statements and possibly also rallying, 
than about tuning in to the news. But this medium has networking functions that are important with 
regard to collective action, where both a news function and a rally-function is served (Segerberg & 
Bennett 2011).  
These  findings  strengthens  the  thesis  about  media  use  and  motivated  reasoning,  although  my 
analyses here, are not adequatly geared to actually test this notion thoroughly. The major problem 
being that the media variables are not differentiated enough. I cannot tell which TV-news channels 
the respondents use, or whether there are any substantial differences between them.
Now, after scrutinising the media variables, and tying them to the hypotheses, I will move on to the 
measures of trust. Given the importance of trust in relation to good governance, compliance and 
collective action (Rothstein 2013, Levi et al. 2009, Kahan 2003), it is natural to expect trust to be of 
importance in relation to climate change mitigation policies generally. 
4.6.2 Trust 
Interpersonal trust
The level of interpersonal trust is quite high in Norway (see ch. 3, Rothstein & Uslaner 2005: 42). 
In this analysis, the measure of interpersonal trust has a statistically significant effect across all 
models,  albeit  to  a  varying  degree.  The  measure  has  a  stronger  effect  in  the  models  directly 
concerning the petroleum industry, where the significance level is below 1% (it is below 10% in the 
two other models). Interpersonal trust,  according to my findings,  increases worry about climate 
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change,  and  levels  of  support  for  mitigation  policies.  At  the  same  time,  people  who  scored 
themselves high in interpersonal trust would be more likely to support a reduction of the petroleum 
production rate. 
These findings largely confirms my fourth hypothesis - High levels of interpersonal trust will have  
a positive impact on all the dependent variables – except for the impact of the variable in the model 
predicting opinions about the production rate.
If we consider the possibility that interpersonal or social trust is built on communal trust norms, 
whereas political trust are may largely be built on exchange trust norms (see Braithwaite 1998), it is 
possible to explain these findings by relating peoples opinion about the petroleum production rate to 
a sense of community. As we've seen, Braithwaite (1998: 46) holds that these trust norms are used 
to a varying degree by everyone – but that they are also tied to political views (Braithwaite 1998: 
67-68). If one largely relies on communal trust norms and to a large extent trust other people, one 
would, most likely also feel obligated to act in a manner consistent with what one expects of others.  
One  would  favour  a  reduction  of  the  Norwegian  petroleum production  rate,  because  of  a  felt 
responsibility toward the global collectivity. 
This notion raises some questions, however, since the effect of the variable is not equally strong 
across  all  the  models.  First,  there  is  the  notion  of  reciprocity  (Kahan  2003),  which  has  been 
confirmed to matter in the Norwegian context (Tvinnereim & Lachapelle 2014). I have tied this 
notion to Braithwaite's (1998) exchange trust norms, which rests on values that to a larger degree 
makes a distinction between “us” and “them”, economic prosperity and security. It is possible that 
the media are contributing here, for instance by framing “the other”: Do they, for example, frame 
other nations at the COP (Conference Of the Parties) -negotiations under the UNFCCC (the United 
Nations  Framwork  Convention  on  Climate  Change)  as  “the  others”?  Or  is  the  frame  one  of 
solidarity  and a  joint venture? There  is,  to  my knowledge,  not  any research conducted on this 
particular  theme  in  the  Norwegian  context,  but  we do know that  the  media  influence  peoples 
political trust elsewhere negatively (Mutz 2007, Mutz & Reeves 2005, Gordon 2000) and in climate 
scientists (Leizerowits et al. 2012). 
A series of bivariate OLS analyses, that can be seen in table 4-3 below, shows that both TV-news 
use and newspaper reading influence interpersonal trust positively. Twitter-use, on the other hand 
has a negative influence. 
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Table 4-3: Bivariate analysis with Interpersonal trust the dependent variable
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P N BP-test Normality Reset
TV 0.07 +2.23 +2.11 0.035** 4529 0.659 0.000*** 0.001***
Newspaper 0.36 +2.18 +12.01 0.000*** 4430 0.011** 0.000*** 0.124
Twitter -0.10 +2.20 -2.37 0.018** 4008 0.220 0.000*** 0.293
P < 0.01*** p < 0.05** p < 0.1*
As can be seen in table 4-3,  however,  the bivariate  model with TV-news use as the dependent 
variable violates the assumption of linearity, and should therefore not be relied upon. So far it seems 
that, for the most part, paying attention to the news, almost regardless of medium (do not forget that 
more than 80% of the respondents never use Twitter) have a positve impact upon interpersonal trust.  
Newton (1999:  592)  shows that  paying attention to  the  news mobilizes  people  politically,  and 
enhance  trust.  His  finding  then,  may  help  explain  why  more  trusting  people  are  also  more 
supportive of climate change mitigation policies, and a reduction of the petroleum production rate. 
Trust in the government
The variable measuring the respondents trust in the government has a positive impact upon the 
dependent variable measuring opinions about the petroleum production rate, a positive but neglible 
impact  on support  for regulation of  CO2  emissions,  and a  negative  impact  on the measures of 
support for a raise in the petroleum tax rate and worry about climate change. This means that if one  
is trusting the government, one is likely to want the petroleum production rate to stay as it is or 
increase, whereas one would be less likely to support the mitigation policies, and be less worried 
about climate change. These findings where statistically significant at less than 1% in three of the 
models, except in the model predicting support for regulation of CO2 emissions. 
These findings largely rejects my fifth hypothesis –  Trust in the government will have a positive  
impact on all the dependent variables – as it holds only in two of the instances, and barely that (see 
tables 4-1 and 4-2).
The citizenry's trust is important to the government. If the citizens trust that the government will 
rule in a good manner, they are more likely to comply with government rules and laws, and the 
government accuires legitimacy (Levi et al. 2009: 354). For a government this is important because 
if a large minority or even a majority, does not comply with rules and regulations, it would seriously  
hamper the legitimacy of the government – or even the regime (Levi et al. 2009, Hardin 1998). On 
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the other hand, it is quite possible to trust or distrust a government for political reasons. In fact this  
may be the rule rather than the exception (Mutz 2007). 
I have argued that interpersonal trust is founded on communal trust norms, whereas political trust is  
more often built on exchange trust norms (Braithwaite 1998). This notion is, to some extent at least, 
supported by Kahan (2003) and Tvinnereim and Lachapelle (2014) in that people expect reciprocity 
in political matters – and climate change has turned in to a political issue (McCright & Dunlap 
2011). People pay their taxes because they believe other people pay their taxes and because they 
believe the authorities will  do good things with the money (Kahan 2003, Rothstein 2000).  But 
Norwegians are less willing to enter an international agreement on climate change mitigation if 
countries such as China abstain (Tvinnereim & Lachapelle 2014). Relying on exchange trust norms 
in political trust also help explain why trust in the government have a positive impact upon peoples 
opinion of the petroleum production rate: Exchange trust norms are founded on security values such 
as  national  economic  development  (Braithwaite  1998:  49).  In  Norway  this  almost  equals 
investments in the petroleum sector. This in turn may then help explain the respondents negative 
attitude toward the notion of heavier taxes on the exploration activities of the petroleum industry. It 
is not good for the Norwegian economy – unless other countries follow suit.
The media may play an important role in influencing political trust. The media serves an important 
accountability function with regards to the government. What the media reports from the political 
scene is affecting how much the citizenry knows about public affairs, and the extent to which they 
trust  the government  (Gordon 2000:  297).  A series of bivariate  OLS regressions  show that the 
media variables have diverging effects upon trust in the government (see table 4-4 below). Both TV-
news use and newspaper reading has a positive effect on the respondents trust in the government, 
which disconfirms the notion of video/media malaise. This is in line with findings from Germany 
and in the UK (Holtz-Bacha 1990, Newton 1999). However, these notions need some further testing 
in the future as particularily  the bivariate regression with TV-news use failed the linearity  test, 
which means that the model is not linear, and thus that the coefficients cannot be trusted (Midtbø 
2012: 114, see table 4-4, RESET coloumn). 
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Table 4-4: Bivariate analysis with Trust in the government as the dependent variable
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P N BP-test Normality Reset
TV 0.14 +1.32 +6.51 0.000*** 4375 0.023** 0.000*** 0.000***
Newspaper 0.15 +1.31 +8.03 0.000*** 4288 0.016** 0.000*** 0.227
Twitter -0.03 +1.32 -1.31 0.191 3887 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.507
P < 0.01*** p < 0.05** p < 0.1* 
Twitter on the other hand has no statistically significant effect, which may be an effect of the rather 
heavy slant on this variable we saw in chapter 3 – 80% of the respondents do not use Twitter at all. 
But  the  effect  that  remains  is  a  negative  one.  Twitter  is  known to  have  been  used  in  protest 
movements, and is, in many respects, a critical public forum (Enjolras  et al. 2014). The average 
Norwegian Twitter user is more left-leaning politically, somewhat better educated, and younger than 
the average of the total Norwegian population (Enjolras et al. 2014: 8). The combination of these 
characteristics may result in the negative impact twitter has on trust in the government.    
Political influence
The variable that measures the respondents beliefs about their ability to influence politics outside 
elections has a negative impact upon worry about climate change and support for the proposed 
mitigation policies, but shows a positive impact on opinions about the petroleum production rate. 
The more one believes that one can only influence politics through elections, the less likely one is to  
support mitigation policies and be worried about climate change, but one is more likely to wish to 
keep status quo or increase the petroleum production rate.  
These  findings  largely  confirm my sixth  hypothesis  –  Believing  that  one  cannot  influence  the  
political scene in other ways than by voting, will have a negative impact on all  the dependent  
variables – except for its positive impact on opinions about the petroleum production rate. 
With regards to climate change, we now very little about the effects of such beliefs, hence I have 
chosen to conduct a few bivariate OLS regressions using the variable Voting as the only means of 
political influence as the dependent varible against each of the media variables. Again the theory of 
video/media malaise seems to be disconfirmed. The use of all three different media sources for a 
news update had a negative impact upon beliefs about political influence. This means that staying 
updated on the news significantly lowers the risk of believing that one can only influence politics 
through voting. TV-news use has the weakest, and the only statistically insignificant, impact among 
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the  three  news  sources.  It  seems that  both  individuals  and  a  majority  of  politicians  are  using 
Norways vaulnerable economic position as a justification for continueing the “petroleum fairy tail” 
and to keep the standards of living.    
Table 4-5: Bivariate analysis with Voting as the only means of political influence as the dependent 
variable
Variable Coef. Std. Err. t P N BP-test Normality RESET
TV -0.02 +1.80 -0.75 0.451 4541 0.197 0.000*** 0.373
Newspaper -0.24 +1.77 -9.72 0.000*** 4441 0.023** 0.000*** 0.018**
Twitter -0.07 +1.79 -2.14 0.032** 4020 0.894 0.000*** 0.644
P < 0.01*** p < 0.05** p < 0.1* 
So, by and large, to stay updated on the news have a positive impact upon peoples perception of 
their own ability to influence politics outside elections, which partly explains why people who are 
worried about climate change and supports mitigation efforts also tend to believe that their voice 
matters. This can be related to previous work, for instanse Newton (1999) who shows that staying 
updated on the news have a positive impact upon peoples mobilization on political issues. These 
findings does not, however, contradict Mutz (2007), as there is no antagonism between believing 
that  one  can  influence  politics  outside  elections  and  still  be  negatively  influenced  by  media 
representations of political debates.  It should be noted however, that the bivariate regression where 
newspaper  reading was the  explanatory  variable  is  not  trustworthy  as  the  RESET test  rejected 
linearity (Midtbø 2012: 114). 
Why people who have a propensity to believe that they have little or no influence on politics apart 
from elections also tend to support the petroleum industry more is a different matter, but seeing as 
education  has  proved  an  important  variable  both  in  direct  connection  to  opinions/worry  about 
climate change (Poortinga et al. 2011, Hamilton 2011), I decided to test this notion. The result can 
be seen in figure 4-1 below.
The figure shows how the effect of reading the newspaper diminishes with lower education when it 
comes  to  beliefs  about  political  influence.  This  could  be  an  indication  that  education  matters 
substantially for the understanding of climate change, and that people who do not possess higher 
levels of education might be more prone to motivated reasoning. Hamilton (2011) shows that in the 
US, education is less important than political view, but then again, climate change is quite possibly 
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more  politically  contentious  in  the  US  society  than  it  is  in  the  Norwegian.  Although  the 
politicization of climate change is salient also in Norway (Austgulen & Stø 2013, and see below).




Which political view the respondents have turns out to be a statistically significant effect in all the 
models, described in tables 4-1 and 4-2. The variable have a positive effect on the three dependent 
variables that measure worry about climate change and support for the two suggested mitigation 
policies. The positive direction of the coefficients here means that people who vote for independent, 
socialist or other parties are more inclined to worry about climate change and support the suggested 
mitigation policies. The effect of political view on opinions on the petroleum production rate is 
negative, meaning that respondents who voted for the liberal/conservative parties are more likely to 
want the petroleum production rate to stay at todays level or they advocate an increase.
These  effects  confirm  my  seventh  hypothesis  -  The  variable  will  impact  the  climate  change  
variables positively, and the production rate variable negatively.
These effects on the various dependent variables largely supports the notion of motivated reasoning, 
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which, as we remember, means that people perceive and interpret facts, events, or similar, according 
to their own outlook on the world and politics (Austgulen & Stø 2013, Levandowsky et al. 2013, 
Norgaard 2011). 
Since my main objective is the effects of the media variables, I wanted to see if news media use 
made  any  impact  upon  peoples  voting  behaviour.  I  split  the  political  view variable  back  into 
indvidual parties in order to be able to conduct an OLS regression. 
Table 4-6: Bivariate analysis with Political view as the dependent variable
Variable Coef. Std. err. t P N BP-test Normality Reset
TV -0.12 +2.65 -2.64 0.008*** 3954 0.850 0.000*** 0.670
Newspaper 0.13 +2.64 +3.29 0.001*** 3884 0.565 0.000*** 0.075*
Twitter 0.11 +2.64 +2.01 0.044** 3488 0.614 0.000*** 0.651
P < 0.01*** p < 0.05** p < 0.1* 
In table 4-6 we can observe that all  the bivariate regressions are statistically significant.  These 
regression show that watching the TV-news influence political view negatively. This means that 
people who watch the TV-news often have more often voted for the liberals or for the conservative 
parties, wheras those who read newspapers and use twitter are more likely to vote for leftist parties.  
None  of  the  regressions  could  show  forth  normally  distributed  residuals,  but  this  is  of  little 
consequence (Midtbø 2012: 114), but they are homoscedastic, and linearity could not be rejected. 
These three models show that media shapes political attitudes also in the Norwegian context. Of 
corse, this is bivariate regressions, so there are bound to be underlying variables that affects the 
results (Skog 2010), but to some extent they confirm the findings from the analysis above: TV-news 
use  affects  the  climate  change  mitigation  variables  negatively,  which  might  indicate  that  the 
representation of these issues on the TV-news are different from the newspapers. When the use of 
TV-news also influence political view, it strengthens the case for motivated reasoning substantially. 
However, it must be repeated that these are all cross-sectional analyses, and therefore I cannot say 
anything definete about the causal direction (Skog 2010: 71-74).   
4.6.4 Controls
Age
From previous research we have learned that older people tend to be more sceptical of climate 
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change (Poortinga et al. 2011, Hamilton 2011). In my analysis this seems not to be the case. In all 
of the four analysis conducted above, the general image is that older people are more worried about 
climate change, and more supportive of the proposed taxation of the exploratory undertakings of the 
petroleum industry.  Both  of  these  results  were  statistically  significant.  In  the  model  depicting 
influences on public opinion regulation of CO2 emissions the effect of age was positive – meaning 
that older people were more supportive, but not significant. 
When it comes to the opinion about an increase or decrease of the petroleum production rate, the 
coefficient was negative and statistically significant. This indicates that younger people are more 
likely to support an increase or status quo when it comes to the production rate. This is a direct 
rejection of my eighth hypothesis – Age have a negative impact worry about climate change, and  
support of the proposed mitigation policies. Age will have a positive impact on opinions about the  
petroleum production rate – and requires an explanation. 
We do know that following the news, whether on TV or in the papers, have a positive effect on 
political engagement (Newton 1999). To assess the impact of age on the use of news sources I 
conducted two bivariate cross-tabulations, with TV and newspaper use as dependent variables, and 
age as the independent variable. I did not do this for Twitter. We may remember from chapter 3 that  
80 % of the respondents do not use Twitter as a news source at all. In addition, Enjolras et al. (2014) 
have mapped out the average Twitter-user, and describe them as young males with high education.
My simple cross-tabulations revealed that younger people use TV and newspapers more rarily than 
older people do, which can be observed in figure 4-2. This may explain why older people tend to be 
more worried about climate change and support mitigation efforts to a larger degree than younger 
people – they simply pay more attention to the news. This may also explain the negative coefficient 
in  the model  depicting opinions  about  petroleum production – since,  after  all,  people get  their 
information  on  climate  change  through  the  media.  This  finding  suggest  that  there  might  be 
something to the information deficit model after all (Austgulen & Stø 2013). Still, we know very 
little about young  peoples motivation for avoiding the news. It is possible that young people are 
experiencing “political fatigue” in relation to climate change, as the issue has been salient on the 
political  agenda since 1988 (Asdal 2011). After almost 30 years,  very little  progress have been 
made. These are, however, speculations on my part, and should be subject to further scrutiny.
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Figure 4-2: Age effects on TV news use and newspaper reading, based on cross-tabulations.
Gender
Gender is one of the demographic variables that has proved important across a host of previous 
studies, and it is also important here. The impact of gender is statistically significant across all  
models at the 1% level. The coefficients are negative in the three models concerning worry about 
climate change, and the two models describing support for mitigation policies.  This means that 
women are more worried about climate change, and are more supportive of its mitigation, although 
between the two mitigation policies the impact was larger on the one concerning regulation of CO2 
emissions. 
In the last model, the one describing opininons about the petroleum production rate (table 4-1), the 
coefficient is positive, which indicates that men are more supportive of status quo or an increase in 
the petroleum production rate. These findings together confirms my nineth hypothesis –  Gender  
will impact worry about climate change, and the mitigation policies negatively, but will a positive  
effect on opinion about the petroleum production rate.
Do these findings suggest that women pay more attention to the news? Again some simple cross-
tabulations may provide some answers, which can be viewed in figure 4-3 below. These cross-
tabulations do not yield any revolutionary findings. Women tend to watch the TV-news a little more 
often than men, whereas the opposite holds for reading the newspaper. Again, I remind my reader 
that these media variables are not differentiated.  I do not know which papers the readers read, 
whether  tabloids  or  the  eqvivalent  to  the  British  broadsheet,  or  which  news  broadcasts  the 
respondents watch.    
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Figure 4-3: Gender effects on TV-news use and newspaper reading, based on cross-tabulations.
Education
This variable received some attention when I looked at its effect upon whether people believed they 
could influence politics outside elections or not,  and how gender affects the level of education. 
More  genereally,  my  findings  coroborate  with  previous  research  (see  Poortinga  et  al.  2011, 
Hamilton 2011). People with more education tend to be more worried about climate change, and to 
support  mitigation  efforts  to  a  higher  degree.  They  are  also  more  prone  to  believe  that  the 
Norwegian petroleum production rate should decrease. These findings confirm my tenth hypothesis 
- Education have a positive impact on worry about climate change and support for both mitigation  
policies. Education has a negative impact on opinions about the petroleum production rate.
The variable is statistically significant across all models, but less so in the model that describes 
support for regulation of CO2 emissions (see tables 4-1 and 4-2). It is uncertain whether this is an 
expression for higher engagement when the petroleum industry is mentioned, or whether support for 
regulation of CO2 is more widespread among the public. It  does,  however,  leave some indirect 
support for the information deficit theory (Austgulen og Stø 2013, Norgaard 2011), in that people 
with less education are, perhaps, less likely to perceive the urgency for swift mitigation action, and 
also  less  likely  to  make  the  connection  between  large  scale  local  petroleum  production  and 
increasing emissions of greenhouse gases globally. 
As we have already seen, choice of media channels may have an effect upon what people think 
about climate change, and mitigation policies, particularily when it comes to the petroleum industry. 
Based on bivariate cross-tabulations using education as the independent variable, and the TV-news 
use and newspaper reading as dependent (it is more likely that level of education have an impact 
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upon choice of media channel, than the other way around). The results may be seen in figure 4-4 
below.
Figure 4-4: Education effects on TV-news use and newspaper reading, based on cross-tabulations.
These cross-tabulations do not reveal much. It would seem that the least educated pay as much 
attention to the news, or more, than those in the next category. However, these cross-tabulations do 
not say much about the the quality of news that are watched and read, nor do they tell us how these 
news are perceived. Hamilton (2011), finds that perception is not really shaped by education, as 
more education did not change peoples minds about climate change to a very large degree. Based 
on the regression analysis above, and the marginal effect in figure 4-1, I would say that Hamiltons 
conclusion may not hold in Norway. 
Income
In previous research, income has proved an important determinant with regards to opinions about 
climate change policies (McCright & Dunlap 2011). It has been linked to motivated reasoning, in 
that those who earn more are more interested in keeping the status quo. Mitigation efforts may be 
expensive, and they may alter the current economic order (Dunlap & McCright 2011, NME 2011, 
Clark & York 2005). 
In my models, income has also proved to be an important predictor in determining what peoples 
opinions on various climate change issues are. In the models depicting worry about climate change, 
and support for taxation of the petroleum industry and support for a general reduction of emissions 
of greenhouse gases, income have a negative effect, meaning that people with a higher income was 
less worried, and less supportive of the mitigation policies. The effect, however, was statistically 
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significant at the 1% level only in the model predicting the respondents support for heavier taxes on 
the petroleum industry's exploration activities.  The effect was not significant in the other models, 
describing support for general regulation of emissions and worry about climate change, which may 
suggest that the respondents are worried regardless of their income, or that people who do not earn 
so much are less supportive of general regulations of CO2.  People who earn more, are also more 
likely to support status quo or an increase in the Norwegian petroleum production rate (see table 4-
1). The coefficients are quite low for all the models, but I suspect that this is caused by the initial 
transformation  of  the  variable  (see  chapter  3).  This  leads  to  a  confirmation  of  my  eleventh 
hypothesis -  Income has a negative effect  on worry about climate change, and support  for the  
mitigation proposals. It will affect opinions on the petroleum production rate positively . 
Based on these findings, it is fair to say that income does affect ones views upon climate change  
and mitigation policies, which could be politically motivated. 
4.7 Summary
In this chapter I have used cross-sectional analysis, bivariate regressions and cross-tabulations in 
order to explain the impact three different news-media have on opinions about climate change, the 
petroleum industry, two climate change mitigation policy proposals. Across the four the findings are 
relatively consistent: Watching TV-news renders support for the petroleum industry and opposition 
towards  mitigation policy proposals  that  specifically  target  it,  whereas  reading newspapers  and 
using twitter leads to increased levels of worry about climate change, and more support for the 
climate change mitigation efforts. 
The strength of these effects, however varies across the models, and it seems opinions regarding the 
petroleum industry  is  particularily  influenced  by the  media.  This  strengthens  the  thesis  of  the 
medias agenda setting (McCombs 2014). But seeing as the various media outlets also had diverging 
effects upon public opinion, there may be differences in the way these issues are  represented in 
various news media (Carvalho 2007, Boykoff & Boykoff 2007)
I  believe  that  a  fruitful  avenue  of  inquiry  will  be  a  comparison  of  content  inTV-news  and 
newspapers, but also between the news in various TV-channels. 
The measures of interpersonal and political trust that have been included in the analysis also had 
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large impacts. This is a relatively new avenue of research in relation to climate change, and should 
be followed up in subsequent studies. My findings here, indicate that political trust have a negative 
impact upon worry about climate change, and the mitigation policy targeting the petroleum industry,  
but  positive  with  regard  to  the  petroleum  production  rate  and  regulation  of  CO2.  Whereas 
interpersonal trust  had more or less the opposite  effects, save with regard to regulation of CO 2 
emissions. 
I have tied these findings to Braithwaits (1998) exchange and communal trust norms, where the 
former emphasise, among other things, national economic development and competitiveness. This 
successfully explains, with some aid from the notion of reciprocity (Tvinnereim and Lachapelle 
2014, Kahan 2003) the support for a status quo or increase in the petroleum production rates and the  
negative attitude towards the proposed petroleum tax. In addition it  explains the non-significant 
outcome with regards to regulation of CO2 emissions, because this may not threaten the Norwegian 
economy.  The communal  trust  norms are tied to  harmony values  that emphasize,  for  example, 
personal  knowledge  and  solidarity,  which  may  explain  the  positive  impact  of  this  variable, 
particularily with regards to support for the proposed petroleum tax. 
In my analysis, age turned out to have the opposite effect from previous studies. Older people tend 
to be more worried about climate change, and they support the proposed mitigation policies to a 
larger extent than younger people. It seems that this may be explained, in part, by media use, as 
older people both watch the TV-news more often and they read the newspapers more often than do 
younger people. 
Table 4-7: Summary of the initial hypotheses and the outcome 
Initial H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H11
Worry + + + + + - + - - + -
Production rate + + - + + - - + + - +
Tax + + + + + - + - - + -
Emission + + + + + - + - - + -
Outcome
Worry - + + + - - + + - + -
Production rate + - - - + + - - + - +
Tax - + + + - - + + - + +
Emission - + + + + - + + - + +
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and future research
5.1 Conclusion
My key objective with this thesis has been to study the effects of various media variables upon 
public  opinion  regarding  climate  change  mitigation  efforts  targeting  the  Norwegian  petroleum 
industry. Under the notion that climate change mitigation policies needs legitimacy in order to be 
defered to, and that this legitimacy comes from the public, I have used Norwegian survey data in 
my investigation into what effects TV-news, newspapers and Twitter have on peoples support for 
mitigation efforts that target the petroleum industry. Four models were computed, using OLS and 
binary logistic regressions. To elaborate further on the findings from the four models bivariate OLS 
regressions and some cross-tabulations were used. 
Given that the burning of fossil fuels is the main culprit with regard to emissions of greenhouse 
gases globally, it is both interesting and necessary to know which opinions the general public have 
toward the industry that  provides the world with these fossil  fuels  –  particularily  in  petroleum 
producing  countries.  The  salience  the  Norwegian  petroleum  industry  has  in  the  Norwegian 
economy,  and also in  Norwegian  culture,  has  already been seen  to  cause  cognitive  dissonance 
among the citizens in one Norwegian community, resulting in collective organised denial of climate 
change in this sample (Norgaard 2011). This may be part of the explanation as to why Norwegians 
tend to  be more sceptical  toward climate science and why they are less worried about  climate  
change than citizens of the EU (Austgulen & Stø 2013), and also why climate change mitigation  
becomes a difficult political task in Norway (Gloppen et al. 2014). 
5.1.1 Answering the research question
Against this backdrop, I  asked  What effects  do various news media have on public opinion on  
climate  change mitigation  policies  targeting  the  Norwegian  petroleum industry?  And the  most 
striking finding in this study is that watching the TV-news renders more support for the petroleum 
industry and less for climate change mitigation efforts, especially when the mitigation policy targets 
the  petroleum industry.  Reading newspapers  and using Twitter  have  the  opposite  effect.  These 
findings  show that  the  different  media  variables  have  different  effects  on  public  opinion,  and 
particularily so when the petroleum industry is concerned. 
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Furthermore, it seems that people may not only be motivated to perceive the news according to their  
world views (Lippmann 1991), but also that they choose a preferd medium that may make this 
motivated reasoning easier (see table 4-7), similar to some evidence from the US (Feldman et al. 
2011).
My findings reveal that interpersonal and political trust are important predictors also when it comes 
to  public  opinion  on  the  issue  of  climate  change  mitigation.  First,  my  findings  suggest  that 
interpersonal trust  and political trust  are built on different trust norms, understood according to 
Braithwaits (1998) notions of exchange and communal trust  norms. Reliance on exchange trust 
norms in relation to politics can explain why people can be worried about climate change on the one  
hand and still want an increase in the production of petroleum on Norwegian territory, as exchange 
trust  norms  are  built  on  values  such  as  national  economic  development  and  competitiveness. 
Drawing  on the  notion  of  reciprocity  (Tvinnereim & Lachapelle  2014,  Kahan  2003)  which  is 
important  in  the  building of  trust,  it  makes  no  sense  for  many Norwegians  to  "dismantle"  the 
contry's most important industry by increasing its tax rate or reducing the production rate, if other 
petroleum producing countries do not follow suit.   
Second,  the level of interpersonal  trust  is  quite high in  the Norwegian society,  and this affects 
opinion on the mitigation efforts positively, whereas it affects opinions related to the petroleum 
production rate negatively. If interpersonal trust is built on communal trust norms these effects may 
be explained by the underlying value base of these trust norms – such as democracy, international 
cooperation, peace and a good life for others – if, at the same time, we consider climate change  
mitigation to constitute a global common good (Tvinnereim 2013).    
Third, beliefs about one's ability to influence politics,  a variables that was included as a proxy 
measure for the overall confidence in the Norwegian democracy, has a negative effect in all the 
models except the one regarding the petroleum production rate. Even if my theoretical framework 
justified the inclusion of the variable, I still could not readily explain these findings, even if they 
appear logical. Bivariate regressions with the media variables suggest that paying attention to the 
news influences ones belief in ones own ability to affect politics positively, but an interaction effect 




Based on these findings, I conclude that TV-news use have a negative effect on climate change 
mitigation  policies  targeting  the  petroleum industry.  Further,  reading  the  newspaper  and  using 
Twitter have a positive effect on the support for climate change mitigation policies targeting the 
petroleum industry. My findings suggests further that the effects of the media on opinions about 
climate  change  mitigation  policies  are  also  influenced  by  media  effects  on  variables  such  as 
interpersonal and politcal trust, which in turn will influence public opinion. 
 
5.1.2 Theoretical implications 
Taken together, these findings lend support to the notion of motivated reasoning, showing that our 
motivated reasoning is  also connected with values associated with our trust  norms. These trust 
norms are deeply embedded our cognitive and perhaps also emotional behaviour  (Kunda 1990, 
Festinger & Carlsmith 1959). The high level of worry about climate change indicates that the notion 
of  collective cognitive  denial  needs some revising,  at  least  as  it  was formulated by Nordgaard 
(2011). However, when seen in connection with the level of support for the mitigation policies, 
which was generally quite low and may have been hampered by the middle category "neither-nor", 
this notion cannot be dismissed.
Media representations are proved to be important, although I have not looked at them directly. The 
media in Norway seem to, generally, enhance the level of both interpersonal trust and political trust  
in the Norwegian society, which is contrary to the findings from the US, at least when it comes to  
TV-representations (Mutz 2007).  But  the fact  that the political  trust  is  low with  regards  to  the 
climate change mitigation policy that targets the petroleum industry, suggests that the government 
may  be  struggeling  with  their  legitimacy  with  regards  to  climate  change  policy  specifically 
targeting this industry (Austgulen & Stø 2013, Levi et al. 2009). 
The diverging effects of political trust and interpersonal trust on the dependent variables suggest 
that the two types of trust are, more or less, built on different trust norms (Braithwaite 1998), as 
argued by Levi (1998). But based on the evidence here, it may be that the trust norms are also  
applied in a way similar to that of motivated reasoning. Most people Norwegians claim to place a 
significant degree of trust in others, and this is important when people are forming their opinions on 
climate change issues. I have been unable to tie notion of reciprocity to individual behaviour, based 
on my findings, but there may be a link, since it seems to matter in relation to politics.  
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5.1.3 Future research
It seems fair to claim that this thesis has broken new grounds. The findings do none the less also 
raise a host of new questions. Here I will present three possible avenues of further research.
There might be substantial differences between the content of the TV-news as compared to the 
newspapers, given the diverging effects related to the petroleum industry. One line of inquiry may 
be to continue with surveys, albeit with more differentiated media variables, as suggested by Holtz-
Bacha (1990) and Newton (1999). Another will be content analysis of TV-news from varying TV-
channels,  as Boykoff (2008) have done.  Are there differences  in  the representations of climate 
change between TV-news and the press? Are there differences in the representations between TV-
channels? The notion of video malaise seem to be largely disconfirmed by the evidence from my 
research, but the strong negative impact TV-news watching have in some instances may warrant 
some more research, particularily on climate change mitigation efforts pertaining to the petroleum 
industry, and political trust in a vein similar to that of Mutz (2007). 
Second, my findings suggest that the media may be spending more time and space reporting on the 
petroleum industry relative to other industries,  given the salience of the findings in the models 
predicting  opinions  about  the  Norwegian  petroleum  production  rate  and  the  model  predicting 
support for the proposed tax on petroleum exploration activities relative to the model predicting 
support for a regulation of CO2 emissions from the industry in general. 
Third,  my findings  show that  both  interpersonal  and political  trust  are  important  predictors  of 
peoples opinions about climate change mitigation efforts. This should be followed up in subsequent 
studies. I have probed the relationship between trust and the media, albeit to a very limited extent. I 
believe this theme deserved more attention in the Norwegian context, particularily the intersection 
between political  and interpersonal  trust.  There are,  perhaps,  ways of  connecting this  to  media 
representations that may influence trust. For example, Tvinnereim & Lachapelle (2014) have found 
that Norwegian citizens are more sceptical of Norway signing an international climate agreement 
where it is known that China does not participate. How do the media construct China as "the other"?
It  would also be interesting to know more about  how the notion of reciprocity works between 
Norwegian citizens. How important is the behaviour of others when an individual decides how to 
act in matters that are related to climate change and environmentalism? 
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5.2 The limitations of this study
Although this study has contributed to the cumulative knowledge on Norwegian public opinion on 
climate change through focusing on what effects the media have on opinions on climate change 
mitigation policies targeting the petroleum industry, there are certain limitations to the study.
First, this is a case study of Norway. Although I draw on litterature from other national contexts,  
most notably the US, this does not mean that my findings can be directly applied to other national  
contexts.  There  is,  however,  no  reason  to  believe  that  this  study  is  not  representative  of  the 
Norwegian population, see chapter 3.2 about data.
 
Second, this is a cross-sectional study, meaning that there are not really grounds for drawing firm 
conclusions regarding causality. The relationships presented here are correlations, and a time series 
or a panel study is needed in order to establish the causal chain in a more firm fashion. 
Third, I have use relatively simple tools from the methods toolkit: OLS regressions, binary logistic 
regressions and cross-tabulations. Although I do not consider this a limitation as such, an ordinal 
logistic regression could have replaced the binary logistic regressions. This would have yielded 
richer results from the models predicting opinions about the petroleum production rate, and worry 
about climate change. 
Fourth, on the whole I consider the validity of this study to be good, particularily since the findings 
are consistent across the four models. However, in a quantitative study there is always room for 
improvement, particularily with regards to the measures used. For the most part, I do not believe 
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Appendix to chapter 3
A3.1 Describing dependent variables





Square root - 0.000
Log - -




Figure A3.1.1: Frequency, percent, and normal distribution of Worry about climate change
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Square root - -
Log - -




Figure A3.1.2: Frequency, percent, and normal distribution of Opinions about the Norwegian 
petroleum production rate
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Square root - 0.000
Log - 0.000




Figure A3.1.3: Frecuency, percentage, and normal distribution of the support for taxation
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Square root - 0.000
Log - 0.000




Figure A3.1.4: Frecuency, percentage, and normal distribution of the support for regulation
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A3.2 Describing the explanatory variables





Square root - 0.000
Log - -




Figure A3.2.1: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of TV-news use 





Square root - 0.000
Log - 0.000





Figure A3.2.2: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of newspaper reading 





Square root - -
Log - -




Figure A3.2.3: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of Twitter use
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Square root - 0.000
Log - -




Figure A3.2.4: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of Trust in the government





Square root - -
Log - -





Figure A3.2.5: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of Interpersonal trust





Square root - -
Log - 0.000




Figure A3.2.6: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of Voting is the only way to 
influence politics
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Square root - -
Log - -




Figure A3.2.7: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of Political view
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A3.3 Describing the control variables 





Square root - 0.000
Log - 0.000




Figure A3.3.1: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of Age





Square root - -
Log - -





Figure A3.3.2: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of Gender





Square root - 0.000
Log - 0.000





Figure A3.3.3: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of Education
 Figure 3.3.4: Frequency, percentage and normal distribution of Squared income
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A3.4 Assumptions of OLS regressions
A3.4.1 Homoscedasticity
Figure A3.4.1.1: Graphically showing homoscedasticity in the model depicting support for more 
tax on the petroleum industry's exploratory activities
Figure 3.4.1.2: Graphically showing heteroscedasticity in the model depicting support for a general 
regulation of CO2 from the industries
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A3.4.2 Normal distribution of residuals
Figure A3.4.2.1: Graphically showing the normal distribution of the residuals in the model 
depicting support for further taxation of the petroleum exploration activities
Figure A3.4.2.2: Graphically showing the normal distribution of the residuals in the model 
depicting support for regulation of CO2 emissions
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A3.4.3 Multicollinearity 
Table 3.4.3.1: Multicollinearity in the OLS models
Variable Support for petroleum tax Support for regulation of CO2 emissions
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
Age +1.41 0.71 +1.41 0.71
Newspaper +1.36 0.73 +1.36 0.73
Income +1.29 0.78 +1.29 0.78
TV +1.25 0.80 +1.25 0.80
Education +1.18 0.85 +1.18 0.85
Political Influence +1.17 0.85 +1.17 0.85
Trust in the 
government
+1.13 0.88 +1.14 0.88
Political view +1.15 0.87 +1.15 0.87
Interpersonal trust +1.14 0.88 +1.14 0.88
Gender +1.09 0.92 +1.08 0.92
Twitter +1.06 0.94 +1.06 0.94
Mean VIF +1.20 +1.20
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Appendix Chapter 4
Weighted and unweighted results from the regressions.
Table A4-1: Worry about climate change
Worry about climate change 
(unweighted)
Worry about climate change 
(weighted)
N 3003 3003
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09
Log likelihood -1236.97 -1236.19
LR chi2 (11) 230.52 (12) 232,07
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
(t-value)
TV -0.08 0.174 -0.08 0.177
Twitter 0.05 0.425 0.04 0.485
Paper 0.16 0.004*** 0.16 0.004***
Trust in government -0.13 0.006*** -0.13 0.006***
Interpersonal trust 0.04 0.097* 0.04 0.110
Political influence -0.12 0.000*** -0.12 0.000***
Political view 0.34 0.000*** 0.34 0.000***
Age 0.31 0.001*** 0.30 0.001***
Gender -0.87 0.000*** -0.86 0.000***
Education 0.31 0.000*** 0.42 0.000***
Income -0.00 0.675 -0.00 0.692
Weight 0.14 0.221
Constant 0.74 0.106 0.36 0.512
Likelihood-ratio test LR chi2(1)  =      1.55
(Assumption: Unweighted nested in weighted) Prob > chi2 =  0.2127
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Table A4-2: Opinions about petroleum production
Opinions about petroleum 
production (unweighted)
Opinions about petroleum 
production (weighted)
N 2987 2987
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.10
Log likelihood -1848.19 -1847.50
LR chi2 (11) 408.61 (12) 409.99
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
TV 0.24 0.000*** 0.24 0.000***
Twitter -0.13 0.005*** -0.13 0.006***
Paper -0.12 0.008*** -0.11 0.010***
Trust in government 0.26 0.000*** 0.26 0.000***
Interpersonal trust -0.06 0.003*** -0.06 0.004***
Political influence 0.13 0.000*** 0.13 0.000***
Political view -0.30 0.000*** -0.30 0.000***
Age -0.34 0.000*** -0.33 0.000***
Gender 0.49 0.000*** 0.48 0.000***
Education -0.37 0.000*** -0.46 0.000***
Income 0.00 0.000*** 0.00 0.000***
Weight -0.11 0.240
Constant -0.05 0.88 0.25 0.572
Likelihood-ratio test LR chi2(1)  =      1.38
(Assumption: Unweighted nested in weighted) Prob > chi2 =  0.2401
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Table A4-3: Support for taxation on exploration activities
Dependent variable Support for taxation of petroleum 
exploration activities (unweighted)




Adjusted r2 0.14 0.14
Standard error +1.37 +1.37
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
TV -0.17 0.000*** -0.17 0.000***
Twitter 0.14 0.001*** 0.14 0.001***
Paper 0.11 0.003*** 0.11 0.003***
Trust in government -0.12 0.000*** -0.12 0.000***
Interpersonal trust 0.06 0.002*** 0.06 0.002***
Political influence -0.08 0.000*** -0.08 0.000***
Political view 0.24 0.000*** 0.24 0.000***
Age 0.18 0.007*** 0.18 0.006***
Gender -0.38 0.000*** -0.38 0.000***
Education 0.20 0.001*** 0.16 0.079*
Income -0.00 0.000*** -0.00 0.000***
Weight -0.05 0.573
Constant +4.11 0.000*** +4.24 0.000***
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Table A4-4: Support for general reduction of CO2 emissions
Dependent variable Support for reduction of CO2 
(unweighted)




Standard error +1.18 +1.18
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
TV -0.05 0.232 -0.05 0.228
Twitter 0.07 0.047** 0.07 0.056*
Paper 0.09 0.013** 0.08 0.017**
Trust in government 0.00 0.868 0.01 0.819
Interpersonal trust 0.04 0.045** 0.04 0.051*
Political influence -0.06 0.002*** -0.06 0.002***
Political view 0.15 0.000*** 0.15 0.000***
Age 0.04 0.492 0.04 0.522
Gender -0.47 0.000*** -0.46 0.000***
Education 0.11 0.018** 0.21 0.009***
Income -0.00 0.173 -0.00 0.182
Weight 0.12 0.099*
Constant +4.82 0.000*** +4.50 0.000***
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